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REAPPRAISING THE REAL ENTITY THEORY OF THE
CORPORATION
MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS*
A s one commentator wrote in 1989, "[c]ritics and advocates agree
that a revolution, under the banner 'nexus of contracts,' has in
the last decade swept the legal theory of the corporation."' Other ob-
servers concur, albeit more guardedly.2 In its usual formulation, the
nexus-of-contracts (or contractual) theory asserts that a corporation is
a set of contracts among the firm's participants.' Because they think
that the contractual theory has normative implications, its proponents
have used the theory to advocate important changes in corporate law.4
The nexus-of-contracts theory's emergence also may have inspired the
significant contemporary literature on theories of the corporation that
began in the mid-1980s.5
* Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business; B.A., 1968, Johns
Hopkins University; J.D.. 1973, Columbia University School of Law; LL.M., 1975, National
Law Center, George Washington University; S.J.D., 1981, National Law Center, George Wash-
ington University.
1. Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment
on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989).
2. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corpo-
rate Law, 89 COLUM. L. RaV. 1395, 1408 (1989) (contractual view of the corporation now well
accepted among economists and many corporate law scholars); Robert C. Clark, Contracts,
Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 1703, 1705 (1989)
(contractual theory now dominates the thinking of most economists and economics-oriented cor-
porate law scholars); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1549 (1989) (in the law and economics literature, it has become standard
to treat the corporation as a nexus of contracts). In addition, some scholars who criticiZe specific
positions taken by contractualists apparently accept their underlying view of the corporation.
E.g., Bebchuk, supra, at 1409 (author uses the contractual framework because it is useful and
illuminating, but rejects the usual contractualist position on mandatory rules of corporate law).
3. E.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L.
REv. 80, 84 (1991) ("[c]ontractarians view the corporation as a set of contracts between the
participants in the business"); see infra note 68 and accompanying text. See generally infra notes
64-82 and accompanying text (describing the contractual theory in some detail).
4. See generally infra notes 173-92 and accompanying text. Perhaps the most important of
these suggested changes is that corporation law should become largely or entirely nonmanda-
tory-that is, should provide a series of standard-form default rules which the parties to the
corporate contract can avoid by so agreeing. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1396-97.
5. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STA. L. REv. 1471 (1989) [hereinafter Bratton I]; William W.
Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 Coaau. L. REv.
407 (1989) [hereinafter Bratton II]; Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of
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As that literature makes clear, however, things were quite different
early in this century. At that time, another conception of the corpora-
tion-the real entity theory-tended to dominate. 6 The real entity the-
ory assumes many forms, but common to them all is the claim that
corporations are real, naturally occurring beings with characteristics
not present in their human members. 7 Thus, the real entity theory dif-
fers sharply from the familiar aggregate theory of the firm, according
to which a corporation is the sum of its human constituents and noth-
ing more.' Because it asserts that a corporation is a set of contracts
and because those contracts must have parties, the nexus-of-contracts
theory also is an aggregate theory of the firm.9 Thus, it too stands in
sharp opposition to the real entity theory.
The real entity theory fell out of favor among American legal com-
mentators after the 1920s.' 0 Today it has few, if any, advocates within
the scholarly legal community."' Outside that community, however,
matters stand quite differently. The theoretical dispute that underlies
the split between real entity and aggregate theories-the long-running
debate between so-called holists and methodological individualists 12 -
Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 575 (1989); Gregory A. Mark, The
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987);
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA.
L. REv. 173 (1985); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201; Sanford
A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REv. 563
(1987); John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of
an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 806 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Bratton 1, supra note 5, at 1490-91 (debate between contractualism and the
real entity theory ended after 1900 due to the former's demise, but the latter survived in law
reviews through the 1920s).
7. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. On the various forms the theory assumes,
see infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
8. On the aggregate theory, see generally infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text. See
also infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (suggesting that the corporate aggregate may have
nonhuman elements as well).
9. "In its most recent incarnation, the private aggregation idea has assumed the garb of
neoclassical economics under the 'corporation as a nexus of contracts' rubric." Millon, supra
note 5, at 203.
10. See, e.g., Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1491, and supra note 6. See also infra notes 58-63
and accompanying text.
11. One likely exception to this generalization is Schane, supra note 5 (whose author, how-
ever, is a professor of linguistics); see infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text. Although it
does not argue for the real entity theory's validity, Hager, supra note 5, seems to have considera-
ble sympathy for that theory.
12. Holism might be defined as the view that "social facts" or "societal facts" (among
them institutions such as corporations and facts about such institutions) really exist, and that
they cannot be reduced to facts about individuals. See, e.g., ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHI.OSO-
PHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 113-14 (paperback ed. 1988). Methodological individualism, on the other
hand, might be defined as the view that social entities like corporations "are nothing but ensem-
bles of individuals in various relations to one another." DANIEL Lrram, VAIETIS OF SOCIAL
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remains a live issue among philosophers and social scientists. 3 Indeed,
holism may dominate within the latter group. 14
All this being the case, perhaps it is time to reappraise the real en-
tity theory of the corporation. This Article attempts such a reap-
praisal. It begins by sketching four well-known conceptions of the
corporation: the concession/fiction, aggregate, nexus-of-contracts,
and real entity theories. Then it considers a question that has preoccu-
pied recent writers on corporate theory: whether theories of the firm
in general, and the real entity theory in particular, have definite impli-
cations for the law and for the social control of corporations. After
that, this Article breaks new ground by reconsidering the validity of
the real entity theory. It does so by evaluating the arguments turn-of-
the-century legal scholars made on the theory's behalf. The article
concludes that, contrary to popular belief, the real entity theory is
more plausible (or less implausible) than its aggregate and contractual
competitors. But none of these theories is sufficiently well-grounded
to be a solid basis for legal or policy implications.
I. THREE THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION
A theory of the corporation might be defined as an attempt to ab-
stractly define the firm's nature or essence. Such abstract definitions
abound." Traditionally, however, three have dominated American
corporate theory. Although their names vary, they can be called the
concession/fiction theory, the aggregate theory, and the real entity
theory. The tale of their triumphs and defeats has been told in detail
elsewhere 6 and will not be repeated here. Instead, this section briefly
describes the three theories, arranging them chronologically in order
of their emergence within American legal thought. Maintaining that
EXPLANATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 183 (paperback ed.
1991). Because they make assertions about what entities actually do or do not exist, these defini-
tions basically are ontological. However, holism and methodological individualism also have
conceptual and explanatory dimensions. See id. at 183-90 and infra note 222.
13. See, e.g., LIrrTa, supra note 12, ch. 9; ROSENBERG, supra note 12, chs. 5-6.
14. E.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 113 (existence of irreducible social facts a widely
held supposition among social scientists). In addition, some contemporary philosophers advocate
various forms of holism. See, e.g., David Copp, What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism
and Legal Theory, 23 DIA.OGUE 249 (1984); Richard T. De George, Social Reality and Social
Relations, 37 REv. METAPHYSICS 3 (1983); David-Hillel Ruben, The Existence of Social Entities,
32 PHIL. Q. 295 (1982); Anthony Quinton, Social Objects, in 1976 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y I.
15. See, e.g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS ANI5 OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 144-45 (3d ed. 1983) (providing at least five theories); PATRICIA H. WaR-
ISANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CoRPoRATIONS 34-46 (1985) (providing five more general models).
16. See, e.g., Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1482-1501; Bratton 11, supra note 5, at 423-33;
Horwitz, supra note 5, at 176-224; Mark, supra note 5, at 1447-83; Millon, supra note 5, at 205-
40.
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chronological arrangement, the section then discusses the aggregate
theory's reappearance in nexus-of-contracts clothing during the 1980s.
The description of each theory draws both on contemporary scholar-
ship and on the sizeable literature on corporate personality produced
from the 1890s to the 1930s.' 7
A. The Concession/Fiction Theory
Although the concession and fiction theories of the corporation
sometimes are treated separately,8 they fit together to form a coherent
whole. Both appear in the standard legal definition of a corporation,
an artificial legal person created by state law. As Chief Justice Mar-
shall declared in the Dartmouth College case, "[a] corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contempla-
tion of law." 19 By declaring that corporations are artificial, invisible,
intangible beings, Marshall stated the fiction theory of the corpora-
tion. According to that theory, a corporation is a fictitious, artificial,
legal person or entity 0 with an existence distinct from the existences of
the people who form it.21 The concession theory, on the other hand,
emphasizes the "existing only in contemplation of law" portion of
Marshall's definition. It does so by asserting that the corporation de-
rives its being by concession from the State." For this reason, the con-
cession theory appears to blend with the fiction theory. If
corporations are creatures of state law and nothing else, they almost
certainly must be artificial, invisible, intangible, and fictional.
17. As Morton Horwitz observes, "[b]eginning in the 1890s and reaching a high point
around 1920, there is a virtual obsession in the legal literature with the question of corporate
'personality."' Horwitz, supra note 5, at 217. Representative articles include: W. Jethro Brown,
The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 L.Q. Rav. 365 (1905); George F. Canfield,
The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 17 CoLmu. L. RaV. 128 (1917); George F.
Deiser, The Juristic Person (pts. 1-3), 57 U. PA. L. REv. 131, 216, 300 (1908-09); John Dewey,
The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); W.M. Gel-
dart, Legal Personality, 27 L.Q. REv. 90 (1911); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associa-
tions, 29 H~av. L. REv. 404 (1916); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality (pts. I & 2),
24 HAxv. L. REv. 253, 347 (1910-11); Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personal-
ity, 32 COLUM, L. REV. 643 (1932); Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283 (1928);
Paul Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1924); Martin Wolff, On the Na-
ture of Legal Persons, 54 L.Q. REV. 494 (1938).
18. E.g., HENN & ALE ANDER, supra note 15, at 144-45.
19. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
20. E.g., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 144-45.
21. E.g., Coates, supra note 5, at 810 (artificial-entity theory views corporation as having
an existence separate from its shareholders).
22. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 145. The legal vehicle for this concession, of
course, is a corporation's charter or certificate of incorporation.
REAPPRAISING REAL ENTITY THEORY
The concession and fiction ideas dominated American theorizing
about corporations in the first part of the nineteenth century. 23 During
this period, corporations were individually created by a specific legis-
lative grant (the special charter), which usually limited them to pur-
poses of a public nature. 24 In such an environment, it may have been
plausible to regard corporations as creatures of the State and little
else, because government played so decisive a role in creating them
and in determining what they could do. In time, however, the conces-
sion and fiction ideas gave way to general incorporation statutes,
which established a uniform, mechanical procedure for forming cor-
porations and thus reduced the State's role in their creation and func-
tioning.25 Although the concession and fiction ideas still pervade
formal corporate doctrine, they play little role in contemporary corpo-
rate theory.2 6
B. The Aggregate Theory
The rise of general incorporation statutes also meant that private
initiative played an increasingly important role in the formation and
behavior of corporations. 27 In William Bratton's words, "[w]ith equal
access to the form assured, corporations no longer seemed a product
of sovereign grace," and "widespread use of the corporate form di-
rected attention . . . toward the social reality of the business and the
creative energy of the individuals conducting it. ' sas As a result, during
the latter part of the nineteenth century some theorists began to use
partnership analogies to describe the corporation, thereby characteriz-
ing it as an aggregate formed by private contracting among its human
parts .29
23. For some details, see, e.g., Mark, supra note 5, at 1447-55.
24. On the special charter system, see, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMER-
ICAN LAW 188-201 (1985).
25. E.g., Bratton 1, supra note 5, at 1486 ("With equal access to the form assured, corpora-
tions no longer seemed a product of sovereign grace . . . ."); Mark, supra note 5, at 1456 ("By
the beginning of the Gilded Age the state supplied only a corporation's robes ... .
26. See Bratton 11, supra note 5, at 433-34, 443-44.
27. Nonetheless, early general incorporation statutes sometimes limited corporate powers in
a fashion reminiscent of special charters. See Millon, supra note 5, at 208-11 (mentioning, inter
alia, specific limitations on corporate purposes and powers; narrow judicial construction of
those purposes and powers; the ultra vires doctrine; prohibitions on owning the stock of other
corporations; limits on corporate capitalization, asset value, and life; and various industry-spe-
cific limits for banking, transportation, and insurance companies).
28. Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1486.
29. See id. at 1489-90; Horwitz, supra note 5, at 181-82, 184-86, 203-07; Mark, supra note
5, at 1457-64. During this period, moreover, the corporate bar sought ways to increase its clients'
freedom from state regulation of all kinds. Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1490; Mark, supra note 5,
at 1457. One means for accomplishing this end was to maintain that corporations possess all the
rights held by their human constituents. Mark, supra note 5, at 1458. For an application of this
idea, see infra note 215 and accompanying text.
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Early versions of the aggregate theory regarded the shareholders as
the corporate aggregate's main, if not only, elements. 0 Later formula-
tions, however, tended to include various other people who make up
the corporation. Thus, the firm aggregate also should include familiar
corporate actors such as directors and officers." Some formulations
of the aggregate theory go further by including other parties with a
stake in the firm's actions.12 Still others add nonhuman components
such as the various intracorporate relationships that link the corpora-
tion's members, the many internal positions it contains, and its inter-
nal rules.3 If it is to be complete, the corporate aggregate probably
should include the fiction theory's artificial legal person as well.14
Except perhaps for this fictional corporate person, the aggregate
theory does not admit the existence of a distinct corporate entity.1
For example, Robert Hessen maintains that "[a] group or association
is only a concept, a mental construct, used to classify different types
of relationships between individuals. ' 36 For a distinct firm entity to
exist, it would have to possess attributes different from the attributes
of its components, but to the aggregate theory the corporate whole is
nothing but the sum of its human (and perhaps nonhuman) parts.
That theory is a species of methodological individualism. 37 As one
prominent 1950s exponent of that position explains:
30. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 5, at 184-85, 203 (discussing early aggregate theories
which seemed to regard shareholders as the only relevant elements of the corporation).
31. To Robert Hessen, for example, "[tihe term corporation actually means a group of
individuals who engage in a particular type of contractual relationship with each other." ROBERT
HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 42 (1979) (specifically mentioning shareholders, direc-
tors, and officers). As this quotation suggests, Hessen probably is best classified as an early legal
exponent of the nexus-of-contracts theory, but the point is unimportant because that theory is an
aggregate theory. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 5, at 203, 229, 231 and supra note 9 and accom-
panying text.
32. See Millon, supra note 5, at 226-27, 236-37 (describing aggregate theories that include,
inter alia, management, lower-level employees, holders of equity and debt securities, and local
communities).
33. See Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are not Morally Responsible for Any-
thing They Do, 2 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1, 18 n.ll (1983) (taking the position that a corpora-
tion is made of a set of positions, a set of relationships, and a set of rules).
34. See infra notes 68, 70, 180-81 and accompanying text (noting some nexus-of-contract
theorists who include the fictional corporate person).
35. E.g., Coates, supra note 5, at 815 (aggregate theorists reject idea of the corporation as
an entity distinct from its constituent individuals and their relationships). See Bratton II, supra
note 5, at 423 (a significant line of thinking concerning the aggregate-or-entity inquiry denies the
existence of a meaningful corporate entity).
36. HESSEN, supra note 31, at 41. See also Bratton I, supra note 5, at 423 (on aggregate
view, "firm entity [is] at most a reification-a construction of the minds of humans").
37. See Bratton [1, supra note 5, at 423 (line of thinking represented by aggregate theory
and new economic theory of corporation applies methodological individualism and attaches de-
terminant significance to firm's aggregate parts).
REAPPRAISING REAL ENTITY THEORY
According to this principle [methodological individualism], the
ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people ...
Every complex social situation, institution, or event is the result of a
particular configuration of individuals. . . . [W]e shall not have
arrived at rock-bottom explanations of such large-scale phenomena
until we have deduced an account of them from statements about the
dispositions, beliefs, resources, and inter-relations of individuals. 8
If individuals are the ultimate units of social explanation, and if
groups such as corporations can be completely described through their
human components, no distinct corporate entity should exist.
C. The Real Entity Theory
By 1900, the early aggregate theories of the corporation had largely
disappeared.3 9 The most likely reason is the emergence of large, man-
agement-dominated corporations, which rendered shareholder-based
conceptions of the corporate aggregate increasingly implausible. Ac-
cording to Morton Horwitz:
The [nineteenth century] contractualist view of the corporation as
essentially no different from a partnership began to come under
attack from the moment it was presented. Its most forceful claim
was that any entity theory of the corporation was a fictional and
anachronistic carryover from a bygone era of special corporate
charters. Yet, the picture of the corporation as a contract of
individual shareholders was itself becoming a nostalgic fantasy at the
very moment the partnership view was most forcefully put
forth....
[D]uring the 1880s it was beginning to become clear that
management, not shareholders, were the real decision-makers in
large publicly owned enterprises.4
As Gregory Mark elaborates, "[tihe attempt to reconceive corpora-
tions on individualist grounds had to face the functional reality that
individual corporators were responsible neither for much of the
growth within a given corporation nor for the adverse consequences
of corporate actions." 41
38. J.W.N. Watkins, Methodological Individualism and Social Tendencies, in READINGS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 269, 270-71 (May Brodbeck, ed., 1968).
39. Bratton 1, supra note 5, at 1490 ("[clontractualism disappeared as a force in corporate
legal theory after the turn of the century"); Horwitz, supra note 5, at 182 (by 1900, the real
entity theory largely had triumphed over contractualist partnership models).
40. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 206.
41. Mark, supra note 5, at 1464-65.
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As Mark also observes, because "[tihe 'life' of the corporation
could no longer be identified with that of the corporators," its "ac-
tions ... had to be recognized as autonomous, the product of its or-
ganization and management." 4 2  Eventually this organized,
autonomous corporate "it" began to be regarded as a real entity in its
own right. British legal historian Frederic William Maitland aided this
development. He helped introduce English-speaking people to Otto
Gierke's organicist writings about corporate personality. 4 The result-
ing real entity theory of the corporation, also known as natural-entity
theory, was influential from the end of the century" until at least the
1920s.
45
Real entity theories differ considerably, but they all distinguish
themselves from the aggregate theory by maintaining that a corpora-
tion is a being with attributes not found among the humans who are
its components. 46 This corporate being, moreover, is a real thing.4 7 In
particular, it is not the artificial entity of the fiction theory. To Arthur
Machen, for example, "[a] corporation is an entity-not imaginary or
fictitious, but real, not artificial but natural."' 4 By using the word
natural, Machen emphasized a view which distinguishes the real entity
42. Id. at 1473.
43. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 179-81. See generally OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES
OF THE MIDDLE AOE (Frederic William Maitland trans., 1927) (1990), (especially Maitland's tran-
slator's introduction); 3 Frederic William Maitland, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 304 (1911). Here, an organicist theory
of groups such as corporations is a theory of groups that analogizes them to biological organ-
isms.
44. E.g., Horwitz, supra note 5, at 179-80 (noting theory's American beginnings in the
1890s). However, Millon contends that the theory only took hold early in the twentieth century.
Millon, supra note 5, at 211.
45. Bratton 1, supra note 5, at 1490-91 (corporate realism survived in law reviews into the
1920s). For general descriptions of real entity theorizing from the turn of the century to the
1920s, see, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 5, at 179-81, 183-203, 207-24; Mark, supra note 5, at 1464-
78; Millon, supra note 5, at 211-20. Of course, the theory still had adherents after the 1920s. See,
e.g., E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV.
1145, 1160 (1932). On Dodd, see infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
46. E.g., Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1475 (to entity theorists, a corporation is a real thing
with existence apart from the existences of the persons connected with it); Horwitz, supra note 5,
at 218 (to real entity theorists, a corporation is separate and distinct from shareholders); Wolff,
supra note 17, at 499-500 (to organic theorists, social organisms are entities that retain their
identity even as their component parts change). Early twentieth century real entity theorists cer-
tainly made this point often enough. E.g., Deiser, supra note 17, at 133 (a corporation has an
existence distinct from the members that compose it); Laski, supra note 17, at 415 (a corporation
is distinct from members, with a mind distinct from their minds).
47. E.g., Bratton II, supra note 5, at 423 (on "entity" view, corporate firm is a real thing);
Horwitz, supra note 5, at 218 (to real entity theorists, groups are just as real as individuals).
48. Machen, supra note 17, at 262.
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theory from the concession theory: The law does not create corpora-
tions but merely recognizes their independent existence. 49
In spite of their agreement on certain general points, however, real
entity theorists differed greatly on the nature of the corporate entity.
Sometimes they described it as an organism. 0 Often they endowed it
with a group will or a distinct personality. 5 ' On occasion, they even
personified it. Consider, for example Maitland's description of the
"German Fellowship":
[It] is no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State's machinery, no
collective name for individuals, but a living organism and a real
person, with body and members and a will of its own. Itself can will,
itself can act; it wills and acts by the men who are its organs as a
man wills and acts by brain, mouth and hand. It is not a fictitious
person; ... it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will. 2
Finally, if corporations resemble natural persons, then they may have
moral rights and duties distinct from those the law gives them. Some
real entity theorists hinted at this possibility."
Many exponents of the real entity theory, however, have decidedly
less organicist conceptions of the corporation. To some observers, it is
best regarded as a system: a network whose human and nonhuman
components form a relatively coherent and stable whole due to their
mutual interrelationships.5 4 To others, it is conceived in somewhat
49. E.g., Brown, supra note 17, at 370 (a corporation is not a creature of law, but is an
entity that has compelled the law to give it official recognition); Deiser, supra note 17, at 138 (a
group is not a creation of law; law merely endows a pre-existing group with legal capacity);
Laski, supra note 17, at 426 (personality of associations is real and not conceded thereto by the
state); Machen, supra note 17, at 261 (a corporation exists as an objectively real entity, to which
law merely gives recognition and legal effect); Maitland, supra note 43, at 314 (group personality
is not a purely legal phenomenon).
50. E.g., Deiser, supra note 17, at 310 (corporate body is a "composite organism"). See
also Mark, supra note 5, at 1469 (discussing the organicism of, among others, Gierke and Mait-
land); Wolff, supra note 17, at 498-501 (discussing several continental thinkers who espoused the
"organism doctrine").
51. E.g., Brown, supra note 17, at 368-70 (endowing the corporate entity with common
will, spirit, and purpose); Deiser, supra note 17, at 310 (endowing the entity with collective will
and collective personality); Laski, supra note 17, at 405 (endowing the entity with "red blood of
a living personality"); Maitland, supra note 43, at 314 (endowing group personality). See infra
text accompanying note 225 for further reference to Laski.
52. GIERKE, supra note 43, at xxvi (translator's introduction).
53. Cf. Deiser, supra tote 17, at 301 (seemingly asserting that corporations have extralegal
rights and duties); Maitland, supra note 43, at 318-19 (apparently asserting that nations have
moral obligations).
54. E.g., WERHANE, supra note 15, at 56 (describing corporations as "intentional sys-
tems"); see Michael J. Phillips, Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of the
Corporation, 2 Bus. ETHICS Q. 435, 450-51 (1992); see also infra notes 270-80 and accompanying
text (developing this suggestion).
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more materialistic terms; for example, as an impersonal decision-mak-
ing structure akin to a machine." Machen, on the other hand, refused
to speculate about the corporate entity's nature5 6 other than to say it
is not like a natural person, it is not a rational being, and it has no
will. 7
D. The Nexus-of-Contracts Theory
The real entity theory ceased to be a force in American corporate
theory after the 1920s. Unlike the concession/fiction and aggregate
theories," changed intellectual fashions probably best explain its de-
mise. 9 During and after the 1920s, scholars increasingly refused to
resolve practical legal questions by deducing solutions from some the-
ory of the corporation. Instead, they assessed competing rules by
looking to their consequences.w In part, this was due to the belief that
such deductions were useless because each theory has conflicting im-
plications." For roughly fifty years, this antitheoretical attitude domi-
nated corporate scholarship in the United States.6 2 During that period,
general assertions about the essence of corporations were conspicuous
by their absence, and attempts to reason from such assertions to prac-
tical legal or policy recommendations were scarcer still.6
55. See John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 Mo-
NIST 488, 488-501, 507-09 (1970). See also WERHANE, supra note 15, at 42-44 (describing Ladd's
position).
56. Machen, supra note 17, at 261.
57. See id. at 262-63, 265.
58. See supra notes 23-26, 39-41 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 5, at 1478-82 (describing the intellectual shift). The most
influential statement of the new view was a 1926 Yale Law Journal article by John Dewey. See
generally Dewey, supra note 17, as discussed in Bratton 1, supra note 5, at 1491; Hager, supra
note 5, at 635-39; and Horwitz, supra note 5, at 175. Dewey's views are treated infra at notes 86-
93, 115-16 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
62. "Theory of the firm had a bad reputation after the realist/anti-realist debate terminated
in the late 1920s.... By 1976, traditional theory of the firm concepts had fallen so far from
view that theoretically ambitious works on corporate structure omitted any mention of them."
Bratton 1, supra note 5, at 1508.
63. Nonetheless, general conceptions of the corporation may have been implicit in some
scholarly discussions during the 1930-1980 period. Due to the scarcity of explicit theorizing,
however, this assertion is conjectural. The uncertainty is illustrated by modern commentators'
differences about the theoretical underpinnings of the managerialism whose most prominent ex-
ponents were Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. Compare Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1491-98,
especially id. at 1494 n.ll0 (suggesting that to Berle and Means, the corporation was a manage-
ment-dominated entity); and Coates, supra note 5, at 829-35 (real entity theory is implicit in the
managerialist theorizing that dominated scholarship on corporations for much of this century)
with Millon, supra note 5, at 220-25 (attributing an aggregate theory of the corporation to Berle
and Means).
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The recent rise of the nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation
has changed this picture dramatically. 64 Although it originated in ear-
lier works by economists, 6 the theory found little acceptance among
legal writers until about 1980.6 Since then, it has gained many adher-
ents. 67 In its most common form, the nexus-of-contracts theory treats
a corporation as a connected group or series of contracts among the
firm's participants. 6t Because under this definition a corporation is
simply a collection of smaller units, the nexus-of-contracts theory also
is an aggregate theory of the firm.6 9 Like the aggregate theory, the
nexus-of-contracts theory refuses to recognize a meaningful corporate
entity distinct from the components that form the corporation. 70 This
64. For descriptions of the theory's essentials, see Millon, supra note 5, at 229-31; Daniel
R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1261-65 (1982). For
more general treatments, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCIiEL, THE EcoNoMIc
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW ch. 1 (1991); Bratton I, supra note 5. at 1476-82 (distinguishing
"neoclassical" and "institutional" variants of the theory); Bratton II, supra note 5, at 415-23
(same) ; Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEo. MASON U. L.
REv., 99, 110-20 (Summer 1990).
65. A 1937 article by Ronald Coase is almost universally regarded as the seminal work un-
derlying the nexus-of-contracts theory. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in READINGS IN
PRICE THEORY 331 (Kenneth E. Boulding & George J. Stigler, eds., 1952). Coase's article origi-
nally appeared in 4 EcONOSICA (n.s.) 386 (1937). See also Butler, supra note 64, at 99 n. 1 (citing
other important economic contributions to the theory's development). The nexus-of-contracts
theory, however, is not the only economic theory of the firm. See generally Oliver Hart, An
Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989).
66. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 5, at 229.
67. Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1476 (nexus-of-contracts theory has achieved wide currency
and acceptance after 1980). See also supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
68. E.g., EASTERBROOK & FischEr, supra note 64, at 12 ("we often speak of the corporation
as a 'nexus of contracts' or a set of implicit and explicit contracts"); Henry N. Butler & Larry E.
Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1990) ("Contractarians view the corporation as a set of private contractual relation-
ships among providers of capital and services."); Ribstein, supra note 3, at 84 ("Contractarians
view the corporation as a set of contracts between the participants in the business ....").
Another version of the theory, however, apparently treats the term "nexus" as a unifying
connection or link rather than a connected group or series. E.g., Bratton 1, supra note 5, at 1478
& n.28, citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 310 (1976) (according to
neoclassical variant of new economic theory of the firm, it is "a legal fiction that serves as a
nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individual factors of production"); Fischel,
supra note 64, at F262 ("[tlhe firm ifself is a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for ... [a]
contracting process" among various factors of production). Because this legal fiction defines the
corporation while serving as a nexus, connection, or link, this version of the nexus-of-contracts
theory resembles the concession/fiction theory. But writers who use such definitions generally
emphasize the private contracts that form the corporation far more than the fictional corporate
entity. See, e.g., id. at 1261-62 (explaining the corporation's origins in private contracting).
69. Millon, supra note 5, at 203; see supra note 9 and accompanying text. As Millon elabo-
rates, the contractual theory's "reliance on economic analysis and vocabulary are novel develop-
ments, but [its] aggregate, shareholder-centered foundation is not." Millon, supra note 5, at 229.
70. Bratton II, supra note 5, at 423 (economic theory of the firm "denies the existence of a
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theory also rejects the organicism to which some versions of the real
entity theory are prone. 71 Instead, the contractual theory of the corpo-
ration obviously is a very individualistic one. 7
According to Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fis-
chel, the contracts 3 that form the corporation may be created in vari-
ous ways.
Some may be negotiated over a bargaining table. Some may be a set
of terms that are dictated (by managers or investors) and accepted or
not; only the price is negotiated. Some may be fixed and must be
accepted at the "going price" (as when people buy investment
instruments traded in the market). Some may be implied by courts or
legislatures trying to supply the terms that would have been
negotiated had people addressed the problem explicitly. Even terms
that are invariant-such as the requirement that the board of
directors act only by a majority of a quorum-are contractual to the
extent that they produce offsetting voluntary arrangements.
74
In addition, these contracts usually are negotiated by representatives."
Examples of typical contractual terms include those found in the arti-
cles of incorporation, contained in agreements with employees and
suppliers, associated with debt and equity instruments, or set by the
law and not varied by the corporation.7 6
meaningful corporate entity"). Some nexus-of-contracts theorists refuse to recognize any distinct
corporate entity. E.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 68, at 3 n.1 (preferring the term "contrac-
tual theory" to the common nexus-of-contracts label because the latter may suggest "that the
corporation exists as an entity apart from the contracts among its participants," and asserting
that "there is no conceptual justification for reifying" the bundle of interrelated contractual
relationships that constitutes the corporation). Other versions of the contractual theory, how-
ever, at least seem to include the artificial corporate person of the fiction theory. See supra note
68. Bratton may have had these versions of the theory in mind when he wrote that "[i]n the
neoclassical picture, the corporate entity . . almost disappears. It dissolves into disaggregated
but interrelated transactions among the participating human actors. Some transactions involve
the fictive firm entity as a party, but only as a matter of convenience." Bratton II, supra note 5,
at 420.
71. E.g., Bratton It, supra note 5, at 427 (nexus-of-contracts view resists the introduction
of organicist thinking in business contexts).
72. E.g., id. at 423 (identifying contractual theory with methodological individualism); id.
at 430 ("extreme individualism" of theory); id. at 439-40 (theory embodies "unmitigated liberal
individualism"); id. at 457-58 (theory "manifests a liberal vision in which individual choice
shapes social life").
73. According to one observer, these "contracts" do not necessarily contain legally en-
forceable promises, but merely are arrangements involving mutual expectations between two or
more parties. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1549 (calling this the "economists' conception of a
'contract'").
74. EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 64, at 14.
75. Id. at 16.
76. See id.
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From this, it follows that various classes of people are parties to the
contracts that form the corporation and therefore are participants in
it. Some accounts emphasize such important corporate actors as
shareholders and managers. 77 Others identify employees and credi-
tors,"' while still others add suppliers, bondholders, and customers. 79
As the inclusion of these groups suggests, to nexus-of-contracts theor-
ists the "corporation" has no precise boundaries.80 Whatever their
identity, however, the classes of people who are corporation members
apparently share some traits. Although contractualists seem not to
stress the point, it is likely that these human units are not flesh-and-
blood people, but the rational utility maximizers of economic theory.
To Bratton, for example, they "are rational, economic actors driven
by their divergent self-interests, and seeking to maximize values for
themselves" 81-actors "denuded of significant human characteris-
tics." 82
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE THEORY
American legal scholars from roughly 1930 to 1980 did little explicit
theorizing about the nature of corporations. Apparently, the main
reason was a widespread belief that such theorizing cannot, or should
not, dictate particular legal rules. John Dewey articulated what was
probably the most important early statement of this view in a 1926
article.83 Dewey made two influential arguments. First, practical legal
questions should be resolved by assessing the consequences of compet-
ing rules, not by deduction from some theory of the corporation. Sec-
ond, even if recourse to such theories were otherwise acceptable, they
would not be useful to legal decision makers because any particular
theory of the corporation usually has conflicting practical implica-
tions.
77. Fischel, supra note 64, at 1262 n.9 (confining himself to shareholders and managers,
but recognizing that other parties such as employees also can be included). See also Millon,
supra note 5, at 229 (describing the theory as shareholder-centered).
78. E.g., Ribstein, supra note 3, at 84.
79. E.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 1549 (describing the theory). See also supra notes 30-34
and accompanying text (discussing versions of the aggregate theory that include other classes of
humans and even some nonhuman components within the aggregate).
80. Bratton I, supra note 5, at 420 (describing the theory). See also Hart, supra note 65, at
1764 (on nexus-of-contracts view, there is "little point in trying to distinguish between transac-
tions within a firm and those between firms").
81. Bratton II, supra note 5, at 417 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 462. See also Millon, supra note 5. at 231 (nexus-of-contracts theory "conceives
of the firm as nothing more or less than the product of individual actors freely contracting
according to their own utility calculations").
83, Dewey. supra note 17; see supra note 59.
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This section considers these two arguments in turn, emphasizing the
real entity theory and its possible implications. After that, the section
suggests a few of the real entity theory's implications for contempo-
rary debates. The section concludes by discussing a subject whose im-
portance this Article generally downplays; the possibility that if
corporations are real entities, they may have moral rights. Through-
out, this section assumes arguendo that some theory of the corpora-
tion (most often the real entity theory) is true. 4 The section's main
conclusion is that while few, if any, specific legal rules flow directly
and unequivocally from the real entity theory, its acceptance would
influence debates over certain legal questions and over certain issues
involving the social control of corporations. In particular, if the the-
ory is valid, the drives, interests, and obligations of the corporate
group become factors that ought to be considered in some decisional
contexts. More specifically, if the theory is true and if the corporate
real entity assumes certain forms, corporations could have moral du-
ties that sometimes might affect legal and policy deliberations. Again,
however, such considerations ordinarily would not dictate specific le-
gal outcomes by themselves. Rather, to quote Horwitz, they only
would "tilt" or influence the resolution of certain issuesSS
A. Legal Instrumentalism and Corporate Theory
1. Dewey's Consequentialism
Dewey's article opened with its conclusion: "that for the purposes
of law the conception of 'person,' is a legal conception; put roughly,
'person' signifies what law makes it signify. '8 6 By taking that posi-
tion, Dewey denied that the corporate legal personality depends on the
existence of a real corporate person.87 For example, he argued against
"the conception that before anything can be a jural person it must
intrinsically possess certain properties, the existence of which is neces-
sary to constitute anything a person.""8 This conception, Dewey sug-
gested, rests on a particular kind of definition: one that reflects "a
definite metaphysical conception regarding the nature of things," and
84. The next section discusses the real entity theory's validity. In the process, it makes some
arguments against the aggregate and nexus-of-contracts theories.
85. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 176; see infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
86. Dewey, supra note 17, at 655.
87. Turn-of-the-century real entity theorists, on the other hand, often maintained that the
law merely recognizes the reality of a preexisting and naturally occurring corporate being. See
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
88. Dewey, supra note 17, at 658; see id. at 658-60.
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"proceeds in terms of an essential and universal inhering nature."8 9
But he rejected such conceptions in favor of a definition "which pro-
ceeds in terms of consequences.9 In this view, "a thing is-is defined
as-what it does, 'what-it-does' being stated in terms of specific ef-
fects extrinsically wrought in other things. ,91
In spite of his language, Dewey probably did not intend that the law
should literally define the word corporation in terms of conse-
quences-that it should say, for example, "'corporation' = conse-
quences a, b, and c." For one thing, he conceded that groups such as
corporations have a real, underlying social identity of their own, dis-
tinct from the identities of the people who form them. 92 This is diffi-
cult to square with the view that corporations are their consequences.
But to Dewey neither this underlying social reality, nor any other basis
for abstractly defining corporations, should control lawmakers. In-
stead, he evidently thought the decision whether to treat something as
a legal person or to give it certain rights and duties should be gov-
erned by the consequences of so doing.93
89. Id. at 60.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 660-61.
92.
Almost every English writer, beginning with Maitland, who has written in behalf of
the doctrine of the "real personality" of corporate bodies, has felt obligated to quote
the following from Dicey: "When a body of twenty or two thousand or two hundred
thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular way for some common
purpose, they create a body which by no fiction of law but by the very nature of
things, differs from the individuals of whom it is composed." Assuredly; but why
should such a fact be thought to have any bearing at all upon the problem of person-
ality?"
Id. at 673 (emphasis added). See also Radin, supra note 17, at 665 (Dewey admitted that some
social reality exists in back of, or in, corporate action).
93. At one point Dewey asked why molecules, trees, and tables are not fit candidates for
legal attributes. Dewey, supra note 17, at 660. The reason is that to give them such attributes
would have no consequences relevant for legal purposes.
[T]he right-and-duty-bearing unit, or subject, signifies whatever has consequences of a
specified kind. The reason that molecules or trees are not juridical "subjects" is then
clear; they do not display the specified consequences .... The consequences must be
social in character, and they must be such social consequences as are controlled and
modified by being the bearing of rights and obligations, privileges and immunities.
Molecules and trees certainly have social consequences; but these consequences are
what they are irrespective of having rights and duties. Molecules and trees would con-
tinue to behave exactly as they do whether or not rights and duties were ascribed to
them; their consequences would be what they are anyway.
Id. at 661. "But," Dewey continued, "there are some things, bodies singular and corporate,
which clearly act differently, or have different consequences, depending upon whether or not
they possess rights and duties, and according to what specific rights they possess and what obli-
gations are placed upon them." Id. Therefore, the definition of a legal subject "is a matter of
analysis of facts, not of search for an inhering essence." Id.
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Both Dewey's contemporaries 94 and later legal writers9" have
adopted his general view. In particular, they assert that the existence
of corporate personhood should depend on the circumstances.9 These
attitudes typify what Robert Summers calls "pragmatic instrumental-
ism," a widespread outlook he specifically identifies with Dewey,
among others. 97 One of instrumentalism's central tenets is that be-
cause law is an instrument to serve chosen ends, a particular form of
law must be justified by assessing its consequences to determine
whether it advances those ends.98
If these views are correct, the debate over theories of the corpora-
tion seems largely a waste of time. Although the debate may have in-
trinsic intellectual interest, to an instrumentalist it would have little
bearing on the practical issues lawmakers face. Those issues, an in-
strumentalist would assert, should be resolved by assessing the conse-
quences of competing rules and not by deduction from some theory of
the firm. Because it is difficult to ignore consequences in lawmaking
or in any other normative endeavor, 99 these instrumentalist arguments
94. Although he disagreed with Dewey about the consequences of conferring legal personal-
ity on inanimate objects, Bryant Smith echoed Dewey's emphasis on tangible results when he
wrote:
It suits the purposes of society to make a ship a legal person, not because the ship's
conduct will be any different, of course, but because its personality is an effective
instrument to control in certain particulars the conduct of its owner or of other human
beings. The broad purpose of legal personality, whether of a ship, an idol, a molecule,
or a man, and upon whomever or whatever conferred, is to facilitate the regulation,
by organized society, of human conduct and intercourse.
Smith, supra note 17, at 296. See also id. at 298, 299.
95.
[T]here should be little mystery about the nature of a corporation. Whether or not it
should be deemed a separate "legal entity" or "legal person" should depend on the
question to be resolved .... [T]o argue that a corporation is an entity, and therefore
that certain results follow, is to put the cart before the horse. Analysis, in other
words, should be directed not to the nature of corporateness but to the substantive
policies underlying the issues.
Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 1009 (1971).
96. E.g., Smith, supra note 17, at 298. (saying that to argue because corporation is a legal
person for some purposes, it must be so regarded for all purposes; or to say that because a
partnership is not a legal person for some purposes, it cannot be a legal person for any purpose,
is to make corporate personality and partnership impersonality masters rather than servants, and
to decide legal questions on irrelevant bases. See also Hamilton, supra note 95, at 981-82 ("the
nature of a corporation is not static, but may vary from case to case, depending on the issues to
be resolved").
97. See generally Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century
American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About
Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 861 (1981); see also id. at 865 (specifically identifying
Dewey as a pragmatic instrumentalist).
98. See id. at 882-89.
99. "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging
rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy." JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 30 (1971).
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have considerable force. On a deductivist model, for example, corpo-
rate criminal liability'00 should depend on whether corporations can
perform the proscribed acts with the necessary mens rea.'10 But this
would block inquiry into many of the important considerations raised
in modern debates about corporate criminal liability, especially those
involving its efficacy as a corporate control device.°2
2. The Relevance of the Real Entity Theory
Consequences are important in evaluating legal rules. Even so, it
hardly follows that corporate theory has no role to play in the proc-
ess. To see why, it is necessary to take a closer look at instrumentalist
legal decision making. Evaluating legal rules by their consequences re-
quires criteria for distinguishing good consequences from bad. Unfor-
tunately, Summers's pragmatic instrumentalists sometimes failed to
provide those criteria. As he remarks, "the general value theory of
leading instrumentalists was relatively anemic" because "it made little
place for qualitative considerations of policy or justice."'0 3 Some in-
strumentalists, he notes, were extreme skeptics about the validity of
moral assertions. ,04 Still, most instrumentalists believed that values in
general, and the goals of legal rules in particular, could and should
derive from prevailing wants and interests.' 5 In this view, "we are to
100. On the evolution of corporate criminal liability and the liability rules actually in force
today, see, e.g., Michael B. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Poli-
cies, Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEo. L.J. 1, 47-53 (1984).
101. For example, the early common law view was that a corporation cannot be criminally
liable because, inter alia, it has no mind and therefore cannot form the requisite criminal intent.
E.g., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 15, § 184, at 480. This view is consistent with the conces-
sion/fiction theory of the corporation, according to which it is merely an artificial being. Under
that theory, moreover, a corporation could not be legally responsible for ultra vires acts, because
it derives its being and powers from the state, and acts exceeding those powers therefore are legal
nullities. Hager, supra note 5, at 587, 593.
Early advocates of the real entity theory, however, often stressed its ability to overcome these
obstacles to corporate criminal liability. Depending on the real entity's nature, it might be some-
thing capable of having a guilty mind, or at least might be something to which the criminal fault
of its members could fairly be imputed. See, e.g., id. at 585-92 and sources cited therein (discuss-
ing tort liability as well). If a corporation is a real entity, moreover, its powers are "natural
attributes of its own internal life," not "products of state recognition." Id. at 593. Thus, corpo-
rate acts are real, and a corporation may be criminally liable for some of them. Id.; see id. at
592-611 (discussing the turn-of-the-century debates on this question and the related problem of
tort liability).
102. On those many considerations, see, e.g., Metzger, supra note 100, at 62-74.
103. Summers, supra note 97, at 915. Cf. Hamilton, supra note 95, at 981 (observing that
when instrumentalist courts manipulate a deductive "legal person" argument to reach result A
rather than result B, they seldom articulate "why result A is better than result B").
104. Summers, supra note 97, at 879-80.
105. Id. at 874-80.
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take wants and interests of individuals as they are expressed, and we
are not to distinguish between them in qualitative terms; one interest
is intrinsically as good as any other."' ' 6 Therefore, in assessing a legal
rule by looking to its consequences, the relevant consequences are the
rule's effects on prevailing wants and interests and the moral criterion
is the extent to which those wants and interests are satisfied. Where
the relevant wants and interests conflict, decision makers should try to
maximize utility by recognizing as many interests as possible under the
circumstances. 1w
Legal instrumentalism, however, encounters at least one serious
moral objection.10w Instrumentalism maintains that decision makers
should look solely to consequences when assessing legal rules. In addi-
tion, instrumentalism usually employs utilitarian criteria to resolve
conflicts among competing interests, and utilitarianism is universally
regarded as a consequentialist ethical theory. 09 Utilitarianism is rou-
tinely criticized, however, for its obsession with the results of actions
and its lack of concern with other morally relevant considerations." 0
Thus, some moral philosophers have advocated pluralistic ethical the-
ories that urge the evaluation of actions by balancing their conse-
quences for utility against other ethical concerns."' Theories of the
corporation, if true, might generate such concerns. Although this Ar-
ticle does not urge either position very strongly, perhaps views about
106. Id. at 876.
107. Id.
108. Another objection to legal instrumentalism is its allegedly illegitimate attempt to derive
a value (that the law should endeavor to satisfy prevailing wants and interests) from a fact (the
mere existence of those wants and interests). See Summers, supra note 97, at 880 (pragmatic
instrumentalists reduced value questions to questions of fact by translating the interests relevant
to a problem into goals for resolving the problem); id. at 881 (moral issues cannot be reduced to
factual questions). Here, of course, Summers is merely noting the logical gulf between "is" and
"ought." See, e.g., ARNOLD BREcwr, POLITICAL THEORY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF TWENTIETH-
CENTURY LEGAL THOUGHT 207-15 (1959). Because the desirability of satisfying prevailing wants
and interests might find support on other ethical grounds, however, this objection to instrumen-
falism hardly seems conclusive.
109. E.g., JAMES RAC HELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 93 (1986) ("The claim that
only consequences matter is ... a necessary part of Utilitarianism") (emphasis omitted).
110. See, e.g., id. at 93-97 (inquiring whether consequences are all that matter in ethical
theory).
i11. See, e.g., WILL AM K. FRANKENA, Em-ucs 43-44 (2d ed. 1973) (advocating a "mixed"
theory in which the claims of utility somehow are to be balanced against the claims of justice);
W.D. Ross, THE Riowr AND THE GOOD 18-22 (1930) (describing several classes of prima facie
duties, each of which is binding unless outweighed by another prima facie duty against which it
is weighed by intuition; among these prima facie duties are duties of beneficence, which include
duties to make other beings better off in terms of pleasure (or utility)). See also RAwLs, supra
note 99, at 34-40 (sketching, but not endorsing, similar intuitionist approaches).
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the nature of corporations really should influence the decision to
grant them legal personality or to make them criminally liable. " 2
Even if instrumentalism survives these objections, moreover, corpo-
rate theory is not necessarily irrelevant to legal decision making. If the
test for a good legal rule is its ability to satisfy prevailing wants and
interests and if corporations are personified real entities, then their
wants and interests might be relevant factors." 3 For example, if the
effect of a proposed legal rule is to frustrate the interests of a person-
like corporate entity with a real will, why should instrumentalist law-
makers refuse to make this a factor in their deliberations?
B. The Alleged Indeterminacy of Corporate Theory
Dewey's apparent position was that lawmakers always should rea-
son from consequences when deciding whether to personify corpora-
tions or adopt particular rules of corporate law, and should not let
corporate theory influence those decisions. Because such an extreme
instrumentalism looks doubtful, however, it seems that theories of the
corporation can play a role in legal decision making. Even if conse-
quences are all that matter, moreover the corporate real entity's inter-
ests still may prove relevant. Either way, corporate theory can figure
in debates about practical legal questions.
1. Dewey's Second Argument
Dewey had a second objection to letting corporate theory influence
legal decisions, however. This argument proposed that any theory of
the corporation has too many conflicting implications to be useful. He
urged that theories of the corporation have indeterminate implications
because historically "[e]ach theory has been used to serve the same
ends, and each has been used to serve opposing ends." 114 For the most
112. In fact, notions of collective moral fault are not completely absent from contemporary
discussions of corporate criminal liability. Michael Metzger, for example, notes that some courts
"have found corporate criminal intent on the basis of the 'collective knowledge' of a corpora-
tion's employees as a group, even though no single employee had sufficient knowledge to know a
crime had been committed." See cases cited in Metzger, supra note 100, at 52. He also quotes
commentators who argue that imputing certain crimes by directors and high corporate officers to
the corporation is justified because these people "may be fairly likened to the 'brain' or 'alter
ego' of the corporation." Id. at 50-51 (footnotes omitted).
113. To be sure, Summers spoke of individual wants and interests. See supra note 106 and
accompanying text. But why should a suitably personified corporate real entity be treated any
differently? See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
114. Dewey, supra note 17, at 669; see id. at 669-73 and infra note 115. In addition to Dew-
ey's position, the claim that theories of the corporation lack definite significance might assume
at least three other forms. First, one could maintain that theories of the corporation lacked
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part, the specific examples Dewey used to justify this assertion differ
from the issues that have preoccupied past and present American par-
ticipants in the debate and the issues this Article discusses.", Nonethe-
less, his general argument apparently has found widespread
acceptance since the 1920s. 116
historical significance because they were a response to changing social, economic, and legal de-
velopments rather than their causes. Cf. Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1511-12 (although real entity
theory could justify the rise of the management-dominated corporation, that rise may have
sparked the theory more than the theory caused the rise); Millon, supra note 5, at 241-42 (exist-
ing legal doctrine is an important formative influence on corporate theory). For example,
changed circumstances go some way toward explaining the emergence of aggregate and real en-
tity theorizing in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See supra notes 23-26, 39-41 and
accompanying text. Second, one could assert that even where theorizing about corporations does
affect legal doctrine, it hardly is the only, or even the most important, influence on it. Third,
one could argue that a theory's asserted implications simply do not follow from the theory: that
it lacks the claimed power to justify.
Although this Article employs historical examples, this section is concerned mainly with the
third argument. In other words, the Article asserts that the real entity theory, if valid, ought to
influence corporate law and the corporate social responsibility debate in certain more or less
definite ways. Thus, Dewey's examples of corporate theory's indeterminacy, see infra note 115,
are irrelevant except as they involve the specific issues discussed below. The two other arguments
just sketched also are not definitive objections to this Article's position. First, although social,
economic, and legal circumstances influence theories of the corporation, it is difficult to argue
that theory (and human thinking generally) lacks any independent causal significance. For exam-
ple, the demise of the real entity theory early in the twentieth century probably was due mainly
to changes in the intellectual climate at that time. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
Second, because this Article argues only that theory should influence the resolution of certain
issues, see, e.g. supra note 85 and accompanying text, it is no objection that other factors may
influence their resolution as well.
115. Dewey's statement about the conflicting implications of corporate theories went as fol-
lows:
Corporate groups less than the state have had real personality ascribed to them, both
in order to make them more amenable to liability, as in the case of trade-unions, and
to exalt their dignity and vital power, as against external control. Their personality has
been denied for like reasons; they have been pulverized into mere aggregates of sepa-
rate persons in order to protect other laborers from them, to make more difficult their
unified action in trade disputes, as in collective bargaining, and to enable union prop-
erty to escape liability, the associated individuals in their severalty having no property
to levy upon. The group personality theory has been asserted both as a check upon
what was regarded as anarchic and dissolving individualism, to set up something more
abiding and worthful than a single human being, and to increase the power and dig-
nity of the single being as over against the state. Even the doctrine that true personal-
ity resides only in the "natural" person has been worked in opposed directions. It was
first used to give church or state a short and direct road of approach which would
lessen the power of the singular being over against the collective being, while lately,
through being affected by "natural" in the sense of natural rights, it has been em-
ployed to exalt private, at the expense of public, interests.
Dewey, supra note 17, at 669-70. He also argued that theories of the state have presented analo-
gous problems. See id. at 669.
116. E.g., Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1508 (Dewey's indeterminacy assertion became conven-
tional wisdom after the late 1920s).
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2. Horwitz's Rejoinder
Morton Horwitz's much-discussed 1985 article probably is the most
important contemporary critique of Dewey's second argument. 1 7 In
contrast to Dewey, and to Critical Legal Studies scholars who argue
that legal concepts are infinitely "flippable," Horwitz maintained that
"most important controversial legal abstractions do have determinate
legal or political significance."" 18 This is not to say that one can make
certain, mechanical, context-free deductions from general concepts.
Nonetheless, general concepts can help justify certain practical conclu-
sions in particular social or historical contexts. "[W]hen abstract con-
ceptions are used in specific historical contexts they have more limited
meanings and more specific argumentative functions" than they do
when considered in a logical vacuum.' '9 Thus, "in particular contexts
the choice of one theory over another is not random or accidental be-
cause history and usage have limited their deepest meanings and appli-
cations.' 20
The central aim of Horwitz's article was to show that the real entity
theory was a major factor in legitimizing big business and giving it
sustenance during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.' 2'
As the following account suggests, it did so mainly by justifying the
emergence of management-dominated bureaucratic firms and their in-
creased freedom of action. To Horwitz, the theory performed these
functions in at least six ways.
(a) Undermining Concession Theory-Based State Regulation
First, the real entity theory's emergence helped "destroy any special
basis for state regulation of the corporation that derived from its crea-
tion by the state."' One implication of the concession/fiction theory
is that because corporations are products of state action and nothing
else, the states can freely regulate their internal affairs and external
117. See generally Horwitz, supra note 5. See also Hager, supra note 5, at 575-78 and Mil-
Ion, supra note 5, at 243-51 (who, despite differences on particular points, appear to share Hor-
witz's general views about the significance of corporate theory).
118. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 175-76.
119. Id. at 176.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see id. at 221 (stating the same general conclusion and outlining the specific exam-
ples discussed below). See also Mark, supra note 5. at 1470 (real entity theory instrumental in
legitimating the autonomy of corporate life); Millon, supra note 5, at 243 (although economic
changes may have done as much to generate real entity theory as theory did to legitimize those
changes, nothing is wrong with the former view).
122. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 221.
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actions.123 If corporations are real, natural entities, however, this par-
ticular basis for state regulation does not work. The rationale also
cannot stand under the aggregate theory, because that theory stresses
the corporation's origins in private initiative. Yet, while the aggregate
theory is not necessarily inconsistent with corporate bigness,'2 4 nine-
teenth century aggregate theorists tended to oppose large, oligarchic
corporations. 1
25
(b) Justifying Director and Manager Power
In Horwitz's view, the real entity theory also was well equipped to
justify the weakened position of shareholders, and the correspond-
ingly greater power exercised by managers and directors, which ac-
companied the emergence of large business enterprises. 26 The general
idea, apparently, is that if the corporation is a real entity distinct from
its shareholders, the firm's actions need not reflect their wishes, and
instead may rightly reflect the wishes of the directors and (especially)
the managers who actually run it. 127 These developments may not con-
flict with the concession/fiction theory, although the theory appar-
ently does little to legitimize them, but they do seem inconsistent with
versions of the aggregate theory that make shareholders the aggre-
gate's key figures. 28
123. See, e.g., Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private
Property Model, 30 HASTNOS L.J. 1327, 1328 (1979) (describing but not endorsing this view);
Coates, supra note 5, at 811-15 (describing but not endorsing this view).
124. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (discussing modern contractualism's sup-
port for the nexus-of-contracts theory).
125.
Some contractualists were openly hostile to big business and offered the partnership
model as an alternative to the corporate form, to which they ascribed most of the evils
of consolidation and monopoly. But other contractualists were not so much opposed
to the corporation as they were to its oligarchic tendencies. Contractualism was, for
them, a way of reasserting the primacy of shareholder control.
Horwitz, supra note 5, at 220.
126. See, e.g., id. at 183, 221, 223.
127. See Mark, supra note 5, at 1472-73 (noting, in a general discussion of the real entity
theory's influence, that the real existence of the corporation apart from its members meant that
its "life" could no longer be identified with its shareholders' lives and instead became the prod-
uct of its organization and management).
128. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 220 (to some late nineteenth century contractualists, the
aggregate theory was a way to reassert shareholder primacy). See also Hager, supra note 5, at
580 (the real entity theory might more easily explain the trend for internal corporate power to
move from shareholders to directors and managers). On shareholder-centered versions of the
aggregate theory, see supra note 30 and accompanying text. For the nexus-of-contract theory's
explanation of shareholders' reduced power, see infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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(c) Majority Shareholder Consent to Mergers and Consolidations
To Horwitz, the real entity theory also helped management justify
the shift from a requirement of unanimous shareholder consent for
mergers and consolidations to the rule that only a majority need
agree.2 9 If a corporation is something distinct from its shareholders,
why should its actions necessarily require their unanimous agreement?
Instead, the real entity's will might be identified with (among other
things) a mere majority of the shareholders. 30 While this majority-
vote rule may not directly clash with the concession/fiction theory,
that theory does little to bolster it either. More importantly, the rule is
difficult to square with any aggregate theory. If a corporation is sim-
ply the sum of its human components, how can "it" decide to act
unless every member agrees to the action in question?'3'
(d) Limited Shareholder Liability
Today, shareholder liability for corporate obligations usually is lim-
ited to the amount a shareholder has invested in the corporation.,
This limited liability, a modern treatise asserts, "is probably the most
significant attribute of the modern corporation."' 33 The reason, pre-
sumably, is that by protecting investors against the possibility of crip-
pling damage awards, limited liability has helped corporations amass
the capital required for modern mass-production business opera-
tions. 34 To Horwitz, the real entity theory played a major role in jus-
tifying the emergence of the modern limited-liability rule. By
129. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 199-203, 223. See also Millon, supra note 5, at 242 &
n.159 (apparently agreeing with Horwitz). For the current law on this question, which differs
from the majority-vote rule in a few particulars, see HaENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 15, § 346,
at 983-84.
130. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 202-03 (will of majority apparently imputed to the corpo-
ration). See also Hager, supra note 5, at 633 (corporate will "represented" by shareholder ma-
jority). But see infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (where Hager sets forth a different
view).
131. For example, suppose that the XYZ Corporation has 100 shareholders, that they are its
only relevant components, and that a mere majority vote of the shareholders is required for
some corporate action. Suppose also that 90 shareholders vote in favor of action A and 10 vote
against it. If XYZ is the aggregate of its shareholders, how can the decision to undertake A be
regarded as its decision? In other words, if XYZ Corporation equals 100 particular shareholders,
by definition the decision of 90 shareholders is not XYZ's decision. However, this argument
presumably would not hold where there was a pre-existing unanimous agreement to be bound by
a majority vote.
132. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 15, § 73, at 130; see id. §§ 73, 79, 202.
133. Id. § 202, at 547.
134. See, e.g., FREDERICK G. KEMPIN JR., HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ANGLO-AmERICAN
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 278-79 (3d ed. 1990) (conceding, however, that limited liability is not essen-
tial for this result).
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postulating an independent corporate entity, it forced people to distin-
guish that entity's liability from the personal liability of its sharehold-
ers, thus making it easier to limit the latter while preserving the
former.'35 Because the concession/fiction theory also postulates such
an entity, however, it could help produce the same result. But limited
liability is harder to justify under the aggregate theory, because that
theory normally refuses to recognize a distinct corporate entity. 36 It is
not immediately obvious how a nonexistent entity can be completely
liable for its obligations, while shareholders' liability is limited to their
capital contribution. 17
(e) The Demise of Ultra Vires
Horwitz also maintained that the real entity theory helped further
the large corporation's ability to act as it wished in the economic
sphere. For one thing, it contributed to the demise of the traditional
ultra vires rule.'38 As noted earlier, the old special charter system is
closely linked with the concession/fiction theory, because under that
system the states created corporations on an individualized basis and
limited the powers stated in their charters.' 39 Even with the emergence
of general incorporation statutes during the nineteenth century, many
states continued to limit the corporate powers stated in charters, many
corporations limited their own powers even when not required to do
so, and many courts construed those powers strictly.' 40 The eventual
elimination of these restrictions and the states' increasing willingness
to let corporations pursue any lawful purpose obviously do not square
with the concession/fiction theory. Instead, they are most consistent
with a theory that regards corporations as real, autonomous, naturally
occurring entities whose powers do not derive from the state: Because
it stresses the corporation's origins in free entrepreneurial activity, the
aggregate theory also might support the demise of ultra vires.'4' But
because to this theory the corporate charter is a binding contract
135. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 205, 207-14, 221, 223. The existence of a separate corpo-
rate entity, however, does not logically compel limited shareholder liability. E.g., KEMP[N, supra
note 134, at 286-87.
136. Nonetheless, contemporary nexus-of-contracts theorists sometimes argue that the theory
justifies limited shareholder liability. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
137. Conceivably, however, this problem might be overcome by including the fictional cor-
porate person within the aggregate. See supra notes 34, 68, 70, and accompanying text.
138. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 186-88, 221. See also Millon, supra note 5, at 242 (Hor-
witz's interpretation "seems plausible").
139. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
140. See Millon, supra note 5, at 208-09. See also supra note 27.
141. The nexus-of-contracts theory also might be squared with the demise of ultra vires. See
infra note 171 and accompanying text.
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whose modification requires unanimous consent, it might have diffi-
culty justifying loose judicial construction of that contract. 142
(f) Enabling Foreign Corporations to Do Business
Finally, in Horwitz's view, the real entity theory also promoted cor-
porate freedom by enabling firms to do business in states other than
their state of incorporation. It did so by helping undermine the rule
that states may constitutionally forbid foreign corporations from do-
ing business within their boundaries. 43 If, as the concession/fiction
theory asserts, corporations simply are creatures of state law, it is dif-
ficult to see why other states need recognize their existence once they
leave the creating state's domain.'" This argument collapses, however,
if corporations are viewed as naturally occurring entities with their
own inherent reality. Because it regards corporations as the outcome
of free contracting rather than the product of state power, however,
the aggregate theory also creates problems for this argument.
3. The Real Entity Theory's "Progressive" Implications
Horwitz's arguments for the real entity theory's pro-business impli-
cations have commanded some support. 145 Because the theory may
have other implications as well, however, it does not yet escape Dew-
ey's charge of indeterminacy. In a 1989 article, Mark Hager maintains
that while Horwitz's arguments are plausible,'4 they do not tell the
full story about the real entity theory's impact. "If real entity theory
did indeed provide pro-capital shifts in certain doctrines," he argues,
"it certainly was not meant by its most articulate advocates to do
so.' 147 Instead, these "progressive" advocates "tended to view the
real entity theory as one which would help to curb and check the anti-
democratic effects of large-scale corporation organization" by "arti-
culat[ing] new visions of democratic social life."'
142. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 203 (discussing a nineteenth century aggregate theorist
who argued that unanimous shareholder consent is necessary before a corporation can exceed the
powers stated in its charter).
143. See id. at 188-90, 221, 223. See also Millon, supra note 5, at 242 (Horwitz's interpreta-
tion "seems plausible").
144. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 189.
145. See supra notes 117, 121, 127-29, 138, 143.
146. See, e.g., Hager, supra note 5, at 580-81, 625.
147. Id. at 581. Writings by those advocates include MArrAN4D, supra note 43; Deiser, supra
note 17; Laski, supra note 17; Maitland, supra note 17.
148. Hager, supra note 5, at 581. For Horwitz's brief discussion of the real entity theory's
"progressive" applications, see Horwitz, supra note 5, at 221-22.
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Hager emphasizes two more or less antibusiness implications of the
real entity theory that Horwitz omits or slights. One is the theory's
potential to justify corporate criminal (and tort) liability. 149 The other
is its ability to legitimize institutions between an increasingly powerful
government and an atomized mass of individuals-institutions that
might recreate medieval communities, enable people to resist govern-
ment power, and provide them with meaningful opportunities for
democratic participation.'10 In the American context, trade unions ap-
parently are the most important such institutions.' But while these
two arguments are plausible, they complement Horwitz's account
more than they contradict it. The real entity theory tends to support
the view that groups, rather than individuals, are the basic units of
society. 52 In its more extreme formulations, it also can support organ-
icist theories of society in which corporations, like the body's organs,
are major actors with important systemic functions, and in which peo-
ple resemble cells in those organs. On such views, there is no inconsis-
tency in asserting that business firms are new homes for an anomic
mass of individuals'53 and deserve certain rights and powers1 4 and
should have legally enforceable moral duties. '5
Hager, however, suggests other ways in which the real entity theory
might generate conflicting implications. As previously discussed, Hor-
witz maintained that the real entity theory helped undermine state reg-
ulation of corporations. 5 6 Nevertheless, progressive real entity
theorists argued that because large corporations occupy a position in-
termediate between government and the citizenry, and because their
149. See Hager, supra note 5, at 585-611 and supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
150. Hager, supra note 5, at 611; see id. at 611-25 and sources discussed therein.
151. Seeid. at 617-25.
152. "The argument between entity and contractual theorists during the 1880s and 1890s
was, at bottom, a conflict over whether the individual or group was the appropriate unit of
economic, political, and legal analysis." Horwitz, supra note 5, at 220.
153. See DANIEL BLL, THE COmUNO OF POST-INDuSTRIAL SoctEry: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL
FoREcASTING 288 (1973) (business corporations and other groups now are lifetime experiences
for many of their members, and thus must provide a satisfactory way of life for them); id. at 289
(to the extent that traditional sources of social support such as small town, church, and family
have crumbled, new kinds of organizations, especially corporations, have taken their place).
Nevertheless, one can question how well corporations actually serve these communitarian aims.
154. To Hager, progressive real entity theorists either did not recognize this possibility or did
not take it seriously. See Hager, supra note 5, at 628-30 (suggesting some reasons for each ten-
dency): This subject is discussed infra at notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
155. Of course, inconsistencies may arise when those different aspects of the group's life
conflict with one another. In particular, claimed corporate rights (e.g., absolute or near-absolute
property rights) obviously can clash with asserted corporate duties (e.g., an obligation to protect
the environment) where the rights are exercised in certain ways (e.g., using corporate property to
pollute air or water).
156. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
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activities are socially significant, they are in many ways public institu-
tions. For this reason, they continued, the states can and must regu-
late their internal affairs. 157 Whatever the connection between a
corporation's public nature and its susceptibility to regulation, how-
ever, it is difficult to see how that asserted public nature flows from
the firm's status as a real entity. For reasons noted earlier, the conces-
sion/fiction theory probably best supports the assertion that corpora-
tions are essentially public.'-8
However, Hager notes another implication of the real entity theory
that probably does conflict with one of Horwitz's positions. Horwitz
maintained that the real entity theory supports majority shareholder
approval for mergers and consolidations because the majority's will
can be imputed to the separate corporate entity. 59 But the corporate
real entity need not have this particular will. Instead, it might will
other interests such as the protection of minority shareholders who are
disadvantaged by a merger.160
C. The Real Entity Theory's Contemporary Implications
For the most part, Horwitz's and Hager's portrayals of the real en-
tity theory's turn-of-the-century implications seem convincing. While
those implications differ, they are more complementary than contra-
dictory. Taken together, they generally suggest that if the real entity
theory is true, corporations are real actors with drives and interests
that deserve recognition, and with social functions and responsibilities
that they must fulfill. This conclusion has two implications. First, it
undermines Dewey's argument that theories of the corporation lack
determinate implications. Second, it supports this Article's earlier
contention that if the real entity theory genuinely describes corpora-
tions, then their drives, interests, and duties are factors the law ought
to consider in some contexts.' 6' Again, however, the theory's implica-
tions only would be factors affecting particular decisions; ordinarily,
they would not dictate legal outcomes by themselves.' 62
157. See Hager, supra note 5, at 630-32 (discussing Gierke, Laski, and Deiser).
158. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. According to Hager, however, progressive
real entity theorists believed that in practice the fiction theory was hospitable to the growth of
corporate power. See Hager, supra note 5, at 625-26.
159. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
160. "Under a regime of majority rule, minorities can hope to prevent such oppression only
by convincing courts that the 'corporate interest' is something distinct from mere shareholder
interests as embodied by abusive majorities. Real entity theory is therefore crucial." Hager, su-
pra note 5, at 634 (discussing Deiser, supra note 17).
161. See supra text following note 84.
162. For example, while the real entity theory supports limited liability for shareholders, see
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1. Are the Real Entity Theory's Turn-of-the-Century Implications
Relevant Today?
Horwitz's and Hager's arguments only purport to apply within the
specific social/historical setting of America at the turn of the cen-
tury.' 63 Thus, it is legitimate to ask whether those arguments are rele-
vant today. This is not so much due to changes in the real entity
theory, which legal thinkers have largely ignored for about sixty years,
as it is to the aggregate theory's subsequent evolution. Contemporary
nexus-of-contracts theorists have expanded the aggregate theory's
power to explain and justify. Today, the contractual theory of the
corporation arguably performs some of the "argumentative func-
tions" that only the real entity theory could effectively perform a cen-
tury ago.
Horwitz maintained that the real entity theory helped strengthen
and legitimize big business by: (1) undermining state regulation of cor-
porations based on the concession theory, (2) supporting the trend to-
ward diminished shareholder power and the correspondingly greater
power of managers and directors, (3) justifying the rule that mergers
and consolidations require only a majority vote of the shareholders,
(4) helping to justify limited liability for shareholders, (5) assisting the
demise of the ultra vires doctrine, and (6) undermining restrictions on
corporations' ability to do business in states other than the state of
their incorporation.' 64 Modern contractualism arguably supports both
Horwitz's general contention and almost all of his specific implica-
tions. First, unlike some of their nineteenth-century predecessors,' 6
today's contractualists seem comfortable with big business. In their
view, large firms are simply the product of rational, self-interested in-
dividual bargaining.'" Second, as this Article has shown, the aggre-
gate and contractual theories are hostile to concession theory-based
state regulation of corporations and to the states' failure to recognize
supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text, this rule has an important instrumentalist justifica-
tion as well. By protecting investors against the possibility of crippling personal liability, it has
helped corporations amass the capital required for modern mass-production business operations.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
163. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 175-76 and supra text accompanying notes 118-21. See
also Hager, supra note 5, at 577. "Legal concepts have no trans-contextual, logically-deducible
meanings, but they do have meanings that are powerful and definite in particular historical set-
tings." Id.; see also id. at 576-78.
164. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 221.
165. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
166. "[W]ith the new economic theory, the heirs of the classical tradition surrender to the
corporate hierarchy and embrace it. In so doing, the new theorists announce that corporate hier-
archies had been composed of bilateral market contracts all along." Bratton I, supra note 5, at
1515.
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foreign corporations.6 7 Third, some nexus-of-contracts theorists ar-
gue that the main reason modern shareholders do not play an active
role in internal corporate governance is "rational ignorance" of the
firm's operations. That is, because becoming informed about those
operations involves large costs relative to the likely return, and be-
cause individual shareholders most likely cannot influence the firm's
decisions anyway, the sensible course is not to bother.'6 The resulting
information disparity makes it possible for managers to impose
"agency costs" on shareholders by acting in their own self-interest at
the shareholders' expense. But, the contractualists assert, various
forces (mainly market forces) tend to make managers work vigorously
on the shareholders' behalf. 69 Fourth, contractualists often explain
limited shareholder liability by asserting that rational, self-interested
contracting parties would choose it.17o Finally, nexus-of-contracts
theorists explain the decline of the ultra vires doctrine by claiming that
many alleged ultra vires acts can benefit the firm economically and
that for this reason rational contracting parties would accept the ultra
vires acts.' 7'
So far as the author is aware, however, no nexus-of-contracts theo-
rist has tried to justify Hager's progressive implications of the real
entity theory on contractualist grounds. Thus, the nexus-of-contracts
theory has not usurped all of the real entity theory's traditional justifi-
catory functions. Unfortunately for the latter theory, however,
changed circumstances may have eliminated some of those functions'
practical bite. Because each is fairly well entrenched today, for exam-
ple, Hager's arguments that the real entity theory helps legitimize or-
ganized labor and that it supports increased regulation of business
probably are less significant than they were a century ago. Also, the
real entity theory's ability to justify corporate criminal and tort liabil-
ity, while arguably valid in the abstract, has been rendered irrelevant
by the modern tendency to base each on instrumental considera-
tions. 7 2 Turning to Horwitz's arguments, although the real entity the-
ory still could help legitimize big business, today it hardly needs such
167. See supra notes 122-25, 143-44 and accompanying text.
168. E.g., Butler, supra note 64, at 107 & n.20.
169. See, e.g., id. at 110-20.
170. E.g., EASTErtBrtooK AND FiSCHEL, supra note 64, at 41 ("If limited liability were not the
starting point in corporate law, firms would create it by contract .. "); see id. at 40-54. See
also HESSEN, supra note 31, at 17-18 (limited liability results from an implied contract between
corporate owners and their creditors).
171. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 64, at 102-03. However, contractualists
still might have difficulty justifying the loose construction of the corporate charter that such
actions sometimes might entail. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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support. Except perhaps for shareholders' diminished role in internal
corporate governance, moreover, the legal changes Horwitz discussed
now seem noncontroversial. Thus, they might be of little interest to-
day even if the contractual theory had not developed in such a way as
to bolster them. The same probably is true of Horwitz's one implica-
tion-the majority-vote requirement for mergers and consolidations-
that this Article previously left without a modern contractualist de-
fense.
2. The Contractualist Agenda
The preceding discussion suggests that while the real entity theory's
traditional pro-business and progressive implications retain abstract
intellectual force, their practical importance has been undercut by the
demise of old controversies and by recent elaborations of the aggre-
gate/contractual view. Thus, any argument for the real entity theory's
contemporary significance should stress its relevance to modern de-
bates. Today, the most important implication of the real entity theory
is its potential to undermine the contractual theory and much of the
practical legal agenda based on it. Before considering how the real
entity theory might do so, this Article first sketches the nexus-of-con-
tracts theory's alleged normative implications and the practical agenda
they support.
(a) General Normative Views
Some contractualists use their theory mainly to explain existing cor-
porate law on economic grounds. 73 But both contractualists and com-
mentators on the theory often assert that it also has a normative
thrust. 174 In Jeffrey Gordon's words, for contractualists "[i]t is not
173. E.g., EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 64, at vii (describing their book as mainly
"an exercise in positive economics," whose conclusion is that "corporate law has an economic
structure").
174. See id. at vii-viii (also observing that portions of the book are "openly normative"). See
also Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral
Values, 69 N.C. L. REv. 273, 276 (1991) (although contractualists often purport merely to de-
scribe legal doctrine, some argue that it has normative consequences too).
It is unclear, however, how these normative implications flow from a theory that only pur-
ports to describe corporations. Cf. Bratton II, supra note 5, at 411 (contractualists make "nor-
mative and political assertions in the guise of ontological statements"). On the familiar logical
gulf between "is" and "ought," see supra note 108. In spite of this possible objection, the
remainder of the Article will assume arguendo that both the nexus-of-contracts theory's asserted
normative implications and the contractualists' practical agenda actually flow from the theory.
Because this Article argues against the nexus-of-contracts theory's validity, its overall position is
unaffected by this concession.
Even if the nexus-of-contracts theory fails to support it, the contractualist agenda might get
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simply that the corporation is best described as a nexus of contracts,
but that the corporation should be permitted to function freely in that
way. 7' That is, "private parties to the corporate contract should be
free to order their affairs in whatever manner they find appropri-
ate.' ' 7 6 In particular, where feasible those parties ought to be free
from government regulation in general, and from corporate law's
strictures in particular.'77 Under these circumstances, economic effi-
ciency, wealth, and utility arguably would be maximized as well. "8
(b) The Denial of Corporate Social Responsibility
Some nexus-of-contracts theorists are skeptical about the notion
that corporations have social responsibilities to nonshareholder con-
stituencies such as employees, suppliers, customers, and local commu-
nities. In part, this derives from their belief that self-interested profit-
seeking, if not always beneficial to these stakeholders, works to their
and to society's advantage more often than is generally realized. 79 But
there is a more important reason contractualists deny that corpora-
tions have moral duties. According to Daniel Fischel:
Those who argue that corporations have a social responsibility and,
therefore, that managers have the right, and perhaps the duty, to
consider the impact of their decisions on the public interest assume
that corporations are capable of having social or moral obligations.
This is a fundamental error. A corporation . . . is nothing more than
a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which
various individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual
benefit. Since it is a legal fiction, a corporation is incapable of
having social or moral obligations much in the same way that
inanimate objects are incapable of having these obligations. Only
people can have moral obligations or social responsibilities. .... 180
independent support from ethical criteria such as the intrinsic value of autonomy and/or the
economic efficiency and utility that are said to result from autonomous, self-interested private
decisions. See Clark, supra note 2, at 1714-17 (describing these as two distinct ethical bases for
the contractualists' general normative position). But the real entity theory's validity might gener-
ate counter-arguments against this position. See infra notes 195-200, 207-09, 299-305 and accom-
panying text.
175. Gordon, supra note 2, at 1550 (describing the contractualist position).
176. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 68, at 7-8.
177. See, e.g., Bratton 1, supra note 5, at 1480; Hazen, supra note 174, at 284 (each describ-
ing the contractualist view without endorsing it).
178. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 2, at 1714-15.
179. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 64, at 1269-70.
180. Id. at 1273. Recently, Fischel has taken an arguably different position on the question
of corporations' social responsibilities-that the matter is up to the contracting parties.
An approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of a corporation removes from
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By Fischel's rendering, the nexus-of-contracts theory apparently in-
cludes the fictional corporate person within its aggregate.' 8 ' Whether
it is included or not, though, corporations seem incapable of having
ethical duties. Business ethicists often claim that the criteria for an
entity's subjection to moral responsibility are intent and the ability to
act.' 82 It is not obvious how a purely fictional entity can possess ei-
ther.8 3 Corporate moral responsibility's prospects are even dimmer
under the typical aggregate/contractualist view that there is no distinct
corporate entity of any kind; a nonexistent entity obviously cannot act
or form intentions. t84
(c) Nonmandatory Rules of Corporate Law
Because they value private autonomy and take an antiregulatory
stance, many contractualists also attack mandatory rules of corporate
law (including fiduciary duties), urging instead that the parties to the
corporate contract should be free to set the terms of their interac-
the field of interesting questions one that has plagued many writers: what is the goal
of the corporation? Is it profit, and for whom? Social welfare more broadly de-
fined? .... Our response to such questions is: who cares? If the New York Times is
formed to publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should be al-
lowed to object. Those who came in at the beginning consented, and those who came
later bought stock the price of which reflected the corporation's tempered commit-
ment to a profit objective .... Similarly, if a bank is formed with a declared purpose
of giving priority to loans to minority-owned businesses or third-world nations, that is
a matter for the venturers to settle among themselves.
EAsTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 64, at 35-36.
Returning to the main point, some readers might object that even if there is no corporate
entity to be the bearer of specifically corporate moral obligations, the firm's human members
still have such obligations. Thus, the question of purely corporate moral responsibility has little
practical impact because business people still are individually obligated to behave ethically.
However, although a detailed discussion of the subject is beyond the scope of this Article, it
sometimes matters whether specifically corporate moral obligations exist. This is most likely to
be true where purely individual moral responsibility is not present. In such cases, corporate du-
ties (if they exist) might be transferred to individual corporation members. See Michael J. Phil-
lips, Corporate Moral Responsibility: When it Might Matter, 5 Bus. ETHICS Q. (forthcoming
1995).
181. See supra notes 68, 70 and accompanying text.
182. "It has become standard in moral philosophy to explicate the concept of responsibility
in terms of the notion of intentional agency." Peter A. French, Principles of Responsibility,
Shame, and the Corporation, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION 17, 19 (Hugh
Curtler, ed., 1986). For an argument that corporations also should be morally responsible for
their negligence, see LARRY MAY, THE MoRALrrY OF GROUPS 84-89 (1987). If negligence is in-
cluded, there seems little reason not to include recklessness as well.
183. See Phillips, supra note 54, at 438 (asking how a fictional entity that lacks physical
existence and consciousness can act or form intentions).
184. Id. at 439. See also Jeffrey Nesteruk, Bellotti and the Question of Corporate Moral
Agency, 3 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 683, 688 n.26 (1988) (aggregate view makes corporate moral
agency impossible because it refuses to grant corporations any ontological status).
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tion.11s Thus, they assert that the rules of corporate law should merely
be "enabling" or default rules that the parties can accept or alter as
they wish.8 6 The content of these nonbinding rules should be deter-
mined by asking what terms would emerge from costless bargaining
among rational, informed parties to a hypothetical corporate con-
tract. 8 7 Sometimes it is suggested that economic efficiency and wealth
maximization are the criteria for determining what terms would be
chosen in such a bargaining process.'8
(d) Hostile Takeovers
Nexus-of-contracts theorists also tend to favor the aggressive hostile
takeover activities that were so common during the 1980s.119 Commen-
tators identify at least two general reasons for this tendency. One re-
flects the nexus-of-contracts theory's stress on autonomy, and the
other its belief that autonomous economic decision making promotes
efficiency, wealth, and utility. First, to block hostile takeovers is to
deprive target company shareholders of the freedom to sell their
shares at the high prices offered by takeover bidders. 90 Second, an
185. However, some observers argue that certain mandatory rules can be defended on con-
tractualist premises. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1399, 1404-08; Hazen, supra note 174,
at 286-87. See also Clark, supra note 2, at 1710-11 and sources cited therein.
186. E.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 68, at 7 (under contractual theory, terms of the
corporate contract include provisions of state law, which are regarded as a standard form that
the parties can accept or reject by, inter alia, drafting around the offending provisions); Fred S.
McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89
CoLum. L. REv. 1530, 1537-38 (1989) (any standard-form term supplied by the law must be an
option that the parties can use if they want, but which they are free to contract around if they
prefer). See also Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1396-97; Clark, supra note 2, at 1706; Gordon, supra
note 2, at 1551; Hazen, supra note 174, at 286 (each attributing similar views to the contractual-
ists).
187. E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1410-11; Clark, supra note 2, at 1706; Gordon, supra
note 2, at 1550-5 I; Millon, supra note 5, at 231 (all describing the contractualist position without
advocating it).
188. See EAsERRssOOK & FISCHaL, supra note 64, at 21-22 (a mandatory term might be justi-
fied where one is sure that it maximizes the joint wealth of the participants because it is the term
they would have selected with full information and costless contracting, and where there are no
adverse third-party effects); Gordon, supra note 2, at 1550-51 (to contractarians, the content of
corporate law should reproduce the deal that typical parties would have reached if bargaining
were costless, and the content principle of normative contractarianism is that the sole purpose of
corporate law ought to be wealth maximization).
189. E.g., Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1520 (contractualism of new economic theory "sup-
ports corporate control transactions against management objections"); see also Coates, supra
note 5, at 837 (quoting Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HAxV. L. REv.
1377, 1408 (1986) ("[tlo neo-aggregate theorists, the bidding wars that takeovers prompt are
simply good, old-fashioned 'competition among various management teams"')).
190. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 5, at 235 (contract theory suggests that target company
management should be forbidden to block shareholders' access to the premiums takeover bid-
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unrestricted market for corporate control also benefits society because
it enhances economic efficiency by ensuring that corporate assets find
their most highly valued uses. 91 In particular, it encourages manage-
ment to adopt the efficiencies necessary to minimize agency costs and
ensure maximum returns for shareholders.192 If the encouragement
fails and a takeover results, presumably the corporation's assets will
be deployed more efficiently by a new management team that will
have the same incentives to maximize wealth and will suffer the same
penalties if it fails to do so.
3. The Real Entity Theory and the Contractualist Agenda
Because the real entity theory asserts that a corporation is some-
thing more than the sum of its parts and the nexus-of-contracts theory
denies this, both cannot be true.9 3 If the real entity theory is correct,
therefore, the contractualist agenda obviously loses whatever support
it derives from the assumption that a corporation is a collection of
interconnected contracts and nothing else.194 This critical but easily
stated point aside, the most important contemporary implication of
the real entity theory's validity is the possibility that corporations have
moral duties that sometimes conflict with the contractualist agenda.
In the early 1930s, E. Merrick Dodd Jr. wrote an influential article
that anticipated the arguments for corporate social responsibility
ders are willing to pay for their stock). This argument assumes that shareholders are the most
important components within the contractualist aggregate. Id.; Coates, supra note 5, at 837, but
if the aggregate is broadened to include other groups that tend to suffer from hostile takeovers
(e.g., management, employees, and even local communities), see supra notes 31-32 and accom-
panying text, and if these groups are entitled to protection or to a say in the corporation's af-
fairs, the aggregate/contractualist view might support legal restrictions on takeovers. See Millon,
supra note 5, at 236-37, 239, 250. Because it restricts the shareholders' ability to retain or sell
their shares as they desire, however, this argument coexists uneasily with the economic autonomy
so favored by the nexus-of-contracts approach. In addition, some contractualists argue that the
aggregate's nonshareholder members can protect themselves against the risk of a hostile takeover
by contract, or should be regarded as having accepted this risk and having received compensa-
tion for it if they did not expressly contract to avoid it. See id. at 238-40 (describing but not
advocating this position).
191. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 5, at 235, 240; Coates, supra note 5, at 837 (each describ-
ing this view).
192. See, e.g., Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1520 n.215 (tender offer is a traditional form of
market control that encourages manager-agents to work for their shareholder-principals); Butler,
supra note 64, at 110-14 (describing how the market for corporate control disciplines managers);
Millon, supra note 5, at 235 (takeover threats are said to encourage management to maximize
profits and asset values). On agency costs, see supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
193. It might also be the case that neither theory satisfactorily accounts for corporations. See
infra note 270 and accompanying text.
194. In spite of some uncertainty about the contractual theory's ability to generate normative
conclusions, this Article assumes arguendo that it supports the contractualist agenda. See supra
note 174.
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which have been prevalent since the 1960s. Dodd believed that busi-
ness corporations should have "a social service as well as a profit-
making function.''9- Specifically, while a firm should grant share-
holders a fair rate of return, it also should give employees fair wages
and a measure of job security, charge customers prices that are consis-
tent with its obligations to shareholders and employees, and generally
act in the public interest.'1 In addition, the firm and its managers
should undertake these responsibilities voluntarily, without waiting
for the law to compel them. 197 Dodd recognized that his proposals are
difficult to justify if the corporation is an aggregate of shareholders
who choose directors and officers as their trustees or agents. 198 But, he
maintained:
[Wle are not bound to treat the corporation as a mere aggregate of-
stockholders .... [Tihere is another way of regarding it which has
distinguished adherents. According to this concept any organized
group, particularly if its organization is of a permanent character, is
a factual unit, "a body which from no fiction of law but from the
very nature of things differs from the individuals of whom it is
constituted.'" 99
If the unity of the corporate body is real, . .. then there is reality
and not simply legal fiction in the proposition that the managers of
the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual
members, that they are ... trustees for an institution rather than
attorneys for the stockholders.:0
Dodd's position was that because corporations are real entities with
the duty to behave in a socially responsible fashion, and because cor-
porate managers are fiduciaries for their firms, those managers also
should behave in a socially responsible fashion. Unfortunately, his de-
velopment of that position was sketchy at best. Dodd apparently did
recognize a point on which contractualists agree: It is impossible to
affirm specifically corporate moral responsibility unless corporations
are real entities.20 Unfortunately, he made nothing resembling an ar-
195. Dodd, supra note 45, at 1148.
196. Id. at 1154, quoting Address of Owen D. Young (Jan. 1929) as quoted in SEARS, THE
NEw PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 209 (1929).
197. Dodd, supra note 45, at 1153-54.
198. Id. at 1159-60.
199. Id. at 1160, quoting DicEy, LAW AND Puuuc OPIsoN IN ENGLAND 165 (3d ed. 1920).
200. Dodd, supra note 45, at 1160.
201. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text. As supra note 180 observes, however,
the absence of specifically corporate obligations to society and to the firm's various stakeholders
does not preclude personal moral duties of this kind. If such duties exist, perhaps purely corpo-
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gument for the validity of the real entity theory. Dodd also failed to
consider whether corporations are the types of real entities that can
have moral obligations.2 Apparently he thought that business firms
are sufficiently like natural persons to have such obligations, 23 but he
did not argue the point in any detail. Even assuming that corporations
have ethical duties, Dodd did little to justify the particular duties he
claimed they should meet. For example, he recognized that his overall
position was consistent with the view that a socially responsible cor-
poration's only obligation is to seek maximum profits for sharehold-
ers. 20 4 Dodd's only argument against this view, and for his
stakeholder-based conception of socially responsible corporate behav-
ior was an assertion that public opinion was moving in his direction. 25
But while this may have been true of the decade in which Dodd wrote,
it presumably is not a position he would have maintained had he lived
until the 1980s.
In spite of all these failings, however, Dodd at least used the real
entity theory to sketch an argument that corporations have duties to
certain nonshareholder constituencies. In the process, he made it clear
that the debate over the nature of the corporation is critical to the
question of corporate social responsibility. In all likelihood, however,
this debate has little bearing on the second item in the contractualist
agenda: the assertion that the rules of corporate law should be non-
mandatory. The reason is that the real entity theory probably supports
that assertion as well. Horwitz's arguments that the real entity theory
helped legitimate and nourish big business around the turn of the cen-
tury, especially his stress on the theory's antiregulatory implica-
tions,2 suggest as much. Only the most strongly justified mandatory
rules, one might argue, should be imposed on real beings whose ori-
gins are nongovernmental and whose drives and interests deserve re-
spect. In particular, such rules should not be based on the claim that
because corporations are creatures of the state, state governments
should be able to regulate them as they wish.
rate moral obligations are unimportant because managers would have the same obligations any-
way, and the firm's duties (if any) would be redundant. If managers are personally obligated to
behave responsibly, specifically corporate moral obligations would purchase little or no addi-
tional social control of corporations. However, there probably are situations in which managers'
personal responsibilities are limited or nonexistent, but the firm's obligations remain. See Phil-
lips, supra note 180; cf. Paul B. Thompson, Why Do We Need a Theory of Corporate Responsi-
bility?, in SHAmE, REsPoNsmn.rry, ANt Tma ComPoRATioN (Hugh Curtler, ed., 1986) 113, 117-23;
PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTrVE AND CoiuoaArE REsPoNsmrrY 145-55 (1984).
202. This subject is discussed infra at notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
203. See Dodd, supra note 45, at 1161.
204. Id. at 1146 n.4, 1160.
205. See, e.g., id. at 1160-61.
206. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
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However, the real entity theory's validity would have negative im-
plications for the contractualist position on corporate takeovers. As
just discussed, the theory at least creates a possibility that corpora-
tions and their managers have moral duties to various nonshareholder
constituencies, including employees and perhaps even local communi-
ties. If so, target companies and their managers presumably would be
duty bound to fight attempted takeovers that would threaten such
stakeholders-unless the gains the firm's shareholders would realize
from the takeover outweigh the harm the other stakeholders would
suffer. Indeed, both lawmakers, and even the acquiring parties, might
be required to respect the interests of the target firm's stakeholders if
those interests are sufficiently important to outweigh whatever effi-
ciency gains might result from the takeover.
Another reason the real entity theory works against the contractual-
ist position on takeovers involves the moral weight that should attach
to the firm's drives and interests if the theory is true. In that case, the
target firm itself-its integrity, its personality, and its life-might be
entitled to some measure of respect from lawmakers and other rele-
vant parties. Some takeovers (especially so-called "bust up" takeov-
ers)n°7 cause significant changes in the target corporation's personnel,
operations, culture, and so forth. If corporations are real entities,
such changes would seem undesirable when they alter (or destroy) the
firm against its will." In particular, the firm's integrity, personality,
and life might be relevant factors when courts decide whether target
company managers or directors have breached their fiduciary duties
by taking actions that deny target shareholders the ability to accept a
tender offer.m
4. Corporate Moral Rights and Their Implications
As maintained throughout this section, if the real entity theory is
true and if the corporate real entity assumes certain forms, corpora-
tions may have drives and interests that the law might sometimes be
207. "Rather than continuing target company operations under new and more efficient man-
agement, the 'bust up' takeover seeks to realize gains through large-scale asset liquidations or
financial restructurings." Millon, supra note 5, at 232.
208. See Coates, supra note 5, at 852 (state anti-takeover statutes "make plausible the idea
that 'firms' are indeed self-sustaining beings that the law recognizes and legitimizes," and "at-
tempt to secure the 'natural'-i.e., traditional-shape of the corporation from the battering it
has taken in the last twenty years of takeovers").
209. Occasionally courts appear to take such factors seriously. See Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,267 (Del. Ch. 1989),
aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (suggesting that the law might recognize as valid a perceived
threat to a "corporate culture" that is shown to be palpable, distinct, and advantageous).
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obligated to respect; and also may have moral duties that restrict their
freedom of action. But if corporations are sufficiently like natural
persons to have such drives, interests, and duties, they may have
rights-especially economic rights-as well. If so, would the existence
of such rights undermine the corporation's asserted duties, support
the contractualist agenda on all points, and justify additional legal
rights for corporations?
There probably is less to these possibilities than initially meets the
eye. Historically, there seem to be few clear links between the real
entity theory and the emergence of corporate legal rights. Today, cor-
porations have many such rights,210 rights they have acquired without
much visible help from the long dormant real entity theory. For exam-
ple, the corporate free speech right recognized in First National Bank
of Boston v. BellottiP" was not based on the notion that corporations
are real entities with expressive interests the constitution must recog-
nize. Instead, the main rationale was instrumental: If the marketplace
of ideas is to function properly, corporations cannot be excluded from
participating.2 12 As Horwitz has argued, moreover, the Supreme
Court's 1886 decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Rail-
road,213 which established that corporations are persons for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes, occurred well before the real entity
theory achieved hegemony in America.114
Corporate legal rights may get more support from the aggregate
and contractual theories than from the real entity theory. Santa Clara
County suggests as much. To Horwitz, the aggregate theory most
likely underlay the Court's holding in that case. The reasoning was
that because a corporation is nothing but the aggregate of its human
components, and because those people undeniably are persons for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, corporate rights must be
protected to protect the individual rights of the corporation's constitu-
ents .21 This argument seems easily extensible to other rights corpora-
tions might enjoy. If so, the aggregate and nexus-of-contracts theories
210. See, e.g., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 149-51 (mentioning, inter alia, consti-
tutional rights such as protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, due process, and
equal protection; as well as the rights to sue and to invoke the attorney-client privilege).
211. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
212. See id. at 776-83.
213. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886), aff'd sub nom San Bernadino County v. Southern Pac. R.R.
Co., 118 U.S. 417, and aff'dsub nom California v. Northern R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 417 (1886).
214. "In 1886 corporate theory was in a state of flux both legally and intellectually and the
natural entity theory really was not yet available to justify the holding in the Santa Clara case."
Horwitz, supra note 5, at 183.
215. See id. at 176-78. See also Mark, supra note 5, at 1457-64.
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may be better bases for corporate legal rights and aggressively pro-
business policies than the real entity theory.
The real entity theory's validity also could mean relatively less sup-
port for such rights and such policies. The reason is that the real en-
tity theory's ability to justify corporate moral rights would not
necessarily undermine the possibility of corporate moral duties. Pre-
sumably, moral agents with rights and duties must accommodate them
as best they can. This makes it most unlikely that corporate rights
would invariably override corporate duties. In fact, those duties might
trump corporate rights in many cases.
Therefore, the existence of corporate moral rights would not radi-
cally change the real entity theory's implications for the contractualist
agenda. As just argued, it is unlikely that corporate moral rights
would undermine all the corporate social responsibilities the real en-
tity theory could help support. In addition, the existence of corporate
moral rights probably would reinforce the real entity theory's two
other implications for contractualism's practical agenda. Such rights
could only strengthen the claim that the real entity theory, like the
contractual theory, works against mandatory rules of corporate law.2 16
Further, if corporations are real entities with their own rights, pre-
sumably they deserve considerable protection against hostile takeov-
ers.
217
III. TI TRADMONAL ARGUMENTS FOR TmE REAL. ENTITY THEORY
The previous section presumed that some theory of the corpora-
tion-most often, the real entity theory-might be true. In fact, it
went further by assuming that the corporate entity may have moral
rights and duties. Among law school academics, at least, neither posi-
tion has enjoyed much support for some sixty years. One likely reason
is the relatively skeptical, pragmatic mindset of many post-1920s An-
glo-American legal scholars. This was evident among the 1930s critics
of the real entity theory who dismissed it as medieval, mystical, un-
realistic, and romantic. t 8 Even one of the theory's few recent sym-
pathizers admits that its proponents "stretched metaphysical analogies
216. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
218. E.g., Radin, supra note 17, at 649 (that the corporate group is a real person, distinct
from its members, and that those members are not quite real both are thoroughly medieval
doctrines); id. at 663 (discussions of the corporation have never quite freed themselves from the
touch of mysticism which the schoolmen found natural); Wolff, supra note 17, at 502 (doctrine
of corporation's extrajudicial personality takes verbal imagery for reality and adopts romantic
conceptions).
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to lengths we find quaint in retrospect. "2 19 However, perhaps the most
important reason those sympathizers now are so few, and why the
contractual theory now dominates, is the liberal individualism to
which many contemporary legal academics are attracted.n To anyone
who values human autonomy, personalized conceptions of the corpo-
rate real entity naturally provoke suspicion. Indeed, throughout the
twentieth century organic theories of society, the state, and social
groups have met violent attacks for their alleged anti-individualistic,
and even totalitarian, implications. 22
For these reasons, it is natural to wonder how any modern, ra-
tional, liberal-minded person ever could believe in the real entity the-
ory of the corporation. This section attempts an explanation by
describing and evaluating the main arguments turn-of-the-century An-
glo-American legal scholars' 22 advanced in support of the real entity
219. Hager, supra note 5, at 578.
220. As Bratton remarks, the nexus-of-contracts theory's "intrinsic liberalism" makes it
"attractive to the contemporary legal academic audience, the members of which tend to share
the liberal ideal." Bratton I1, supra note 5, at 458. This "liberal vision," Bratton says, is one in
which "individual choice shapes social life." Id. at 457-58.
221. See, e.g., H.D. Lewis, Collective Responsibility, in CoILacT'a REsPoNsIBILrrY: FNE
DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETmICS 17, 30-31 (Larry May and Stacey
Hoffman, eds., 1991) (organic theory of society and its associated notions of pervasive commu-
nal guilt and collective responsibility "are simply the obverse of the tendency to set some ab-
stract good of the community above the well-being of its individual members, a tendency whose
natural terminus is the ruthless oppression and totalitarianism against which our face is so reso-
lutely set in democratic countries"); Velasquez, supra note 33, at 15-16 (viewing the corporation
as a real entity that can act, intend, and be morally responsible suggests that the firm's members'
interests should be subordinate to its interests; philosophers who subscribe to this view "are
unwittingly allying themselves with [a] new form of totalitarianism" based on the corporation).
Cf. KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS EN MmS 173-74 (paperback ed. 1971) (organic
theory of society is inconsistent with an open society, but is consistent with closed and tribal
societies).
222. Where such work is relevant, the section also considers some nonlegal scholarship: the
continuing debate between holism and methodological individualism in the philosophical and
social science literature. Most references to this work occur in footnotes. Needless to say, this
Article does not treat all of the issues raised in this literature.
Actually, much of the philosophical work on the holism/methodological individualism debate
may have limited relevance here. Because this article is concerned with the existence or nonexist-
ence of a distinct corporate entity, its concerns are ontological. But participants in the debate
sometimes distinguish ontological issues from other concerns whose relation to ontological
claims is not completely clear. Examples include: (1) whether "social" concepts can be defined
in terms of "individual" concepts, and (2) whether "social" concepts or phenomena can be
adequately explained by "individual" concepts or phenomena. See LrrrIL, supra note 12, at
183-90 (who rejects ontological holism). See also Leon J. Goldstein, The Two Theses of Methad-
ological Individualism, 9 BRIT. 1. FOR PHIL. SCI. 1, 1-11 (1958); Steven Lukes, Methodological
Individualism Reconsidered, in Tita PIosoPHY OF SOCIAL. EXPLANATION 119, 121-24 (A.AN
RYAN, ED., 1973) (distinguishing ontological concerns from other issues) [hereinafter RYAN]. In
fact, it appears that ontological concerns tend not to dominate the debate.
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theory and against the aggregate theory. "'3 Most of these arguments,
of course, are relevant to groups and business forms other than corpo-
rations. The section concludes by briefly considering how its findings
affect section Il's position on the real entity theory's practical implica-
tions. This Article takes the view that the real entity theory is more
plausible (or at least less implausible) than any aggregate or contrac-
tual theory. But it is unlikely that the more persuasive versions of the
theory support all the implications developed in section II.
A. Two Weak Arguments
Although the emergence of a new intellectual climate probably best
explains the real entity theory's demise,2 other factors may have con-
tributed. Among them, perhaps, is the low quality of some traditional
arguments for the theory. To test that opinion against readers' evalua-
tions, this Article briefly states and criticizes two such arguments.
1. The Felt Reality of the Real Corporate Person
As suggested, the belief that corporations are real entities has struck
some as unrealistic, romantic, mystical, and even medieval. But it has
not invariably been so. Indeed, some turn-of-the-century observers
claimed to sense the corporate person behind its perceptible compo-
nents. According to Harold Laski, for instance:
[W]e are compelled to personalise these associations.... The Bank
of England is . . . the "little old lady of Threadneedle Street"; but
no one would speak of seven distinguished merchants as a little old
lady. The House of Commons is distinct from "its" members, and,
no less clearly, it is not the chamber in which they meet.... Eton,
we know well enough, is not six hundred boys, nor a collection of
ancient buildings. Clearly, there is compulsion in our personalising.
We do it because we must. We do it because we feel in these things
the red blood of a living personality. Here are no mere abstractions
223. However, this section does not consider the concession/fiction theory of the corpora-
tion. One reason is that today few corporate theorists take the theory seriously because the emer-
gence of general incorporation statutes deprived it of whatever relevance it once had. See
Bratton II, supra note 5, at 433-34, 435-36. Also, while it remains technically accurate, the con-
cession/fiction theory provides an incredibly impoverished description of corporations. The the-
ory asserts that a corporation is simply an artificial state-created legal person. By stopping there,
it impliedly suggests that most of the actors and activities that concern students of modern busi-
ness are not essential to an understanding of corporations. While perfectly true so far as it goes,
the theory also is perfectly trivial.
224. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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of an over-exuberant imagination. The need is so apparent as to
make plain the reality beneath . 25
Because this Article is a qualified defense of the real entity theory, it
cannot employ the most likely rejoinder to Laski's statement: that his
felt corporate personality was simply the product of an overexuberant
imagination. But as an argument for that theory, Laski's appeal to
self-evidence obviously has serious defects. The main reason is that
not everyone shares his perception. Of those who do, moreover, not
all are willing to assume that it represents reality. Perhaps, for exam-
ple, the "living personality" some people sense in institutions such as
Eton is a metaphorical response to purely individual phenomena: the
225. Laski, supra note 17, at 404-05. See also Deiser, supra note 17, at 134 ("a suspicion is
felt" that when people deal with corporations, they find their human components "plus some-
thing more-plus the corporation").
Although he did not develop the point, the last sentence of Laski's statement suggests an
independent argument for the real entity theory, one based on its necessity. To Laski, this neces-
sity apparently was the need for legal controls on large corporations. Hager, supra note 5, at 607
(Laski connected the real entity theory with the "law's evolving need to impose social responsi-
bility" on corporate capital). For Laski and other real entity theorists, perhaps the most impor-
tant of these controls was the imposition of criminal and tort liability on corporations, see
generally id. at 585-611, which was felt to require a corporate mens rea and thus a real corporate
personality, see supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. Thus, the quotation's last sentence
can be read as asserting that the need for corporate criminal and tort liability makes the corpo-
rate person's reality plain. However, Laski did not explain how the real corporate person's desir-
ability could bring it into existence. Absent such an explanation, his assertion reduces to the
following: if society somehow can impute fault to corporations, then society can control their
misbehavior by rendering it criminal and tortious. But the obvious way to achieve this goal is to
explicitly adopt the instrumentalist approach described earlier, eschewing talk of real corporate
entities and instead advocating whatever legal devices are necessary to make corporations liable.
In other portions of his article, Laski also seemed to suggest that the law's evolution demon-
strates the existence of organic corporate entities with real personalities and the muscle to make
their wishes felt. For example, he can be read as suggesting that the demise of ultra vires (and of
the concession/fiction theory on which it was based) resulted from the real corporate entity's
drive to escape the chains imposed by a tight construction of its charter. See Laski, supra note
17, at 405-07, 410-13. He also might be read as asserting that increased corporate tort and crimi-
nal liability reflected the courts' growing tendency to recognize that corporations are real beings
with a real mind and a real personality. See id. at 413-16. But there are other explanations for
the demise of ultra vires and the expansion of corporate criminal and tort liability. Although the
real entity theory helps justify the ultra vires doctrine's slide into insignificance, the aggregate
theory does nearly as well in that respect. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. More
importantly, because tight charter limitations and strict enforcement of the ultra vires doctrine
would inhibit corporations' ability to pursue new lines of endeavor, they would make the econ-
omy less responsive to changing business conditions. As for the increase in corporate criminal
liability, that expansion has been driven much more by the perceived need to control business
misbehavior than by the belief that corporations are real entities capable of forming a mens rea.
E.g., Metzger, supra note 100, at 62 and sources cited in n.431 (major stated purpose of corpo-
rate criminal liability is deterrence of misbehavior by corporate agents). Increased civil liability
for corporations often is justified on risk-spreading grounds.
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shared attitudes people tend to form when they associate together in
groups .226
2. Machen's Equation
Laski's appeal to a felt reality fails because his perception is not
universally shared and because it might be consistent with individual-
istic premises. A rational proof that corporations are real entities,
however, presumably would overcome both objections.2 27 In a 1911
article, Arthur Machen attempted just such a proof. To Machen,
"[a]ny group of men, at any rate any group whose membership is
changing, is necessarily an entity separate and distinct from the con-
stituent members. ' ' 2n He thought this "may be demonstrated mathe-
matically.'' 2 29
Suppose a corporation composed of two members, a and b. Let c =
the corporate entity. Now, if [as the aggregate theory would
maintain] the corporate entity is merely the equivalent of the sum of
the members, then c = a + b. Now, suppose b to assign his shares
to d, then c = a + d. But this cannot be unless b is the same as d,
which is absurd. Therefore, c, the corporate entity, is not equivalent
to the sum of the members.3 0
As any aggregate theorist could quickly point out, however, on Mach-
en's initial assumption the second c (a + d) is not the same as the first
c (a + b). In other words, if t1le corporate entity is simply the equiva-
lent of the sum of the members, "it" changes every time they change.
Thus, it makes no sense to say that the aggregate theory self-destructs
because b and d are different people.
B. Arguments From Language
Machen's mathematical demonstration depended on the assumption
that the corporate entity preserves its identity through changes in the
226. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
227. Some turn-of-the-century real entity theorists, however, maintained that such a proof
was unnecessary. To W. Jethro Brown, the proposition that a corporation is something distinct
from the individual persons who constitute it is "too obvious to need proof" because "[t]he
whole is more than its parts." Brown, supra note 17, at 366. An aggregate theorist, on the other
hand, would say that the whole is the sum of its parts and nothing more. Strangely, the idea that
the whole is more than the sum of its parts has been supported by no less a defender of individu-
alism than Karl Popper. See KARL PoPPER, THEs POVERTY OF HISTOluCisM 82 (paperback ed.
1961) (three apples on a plate are more than a mere sum, because their being placed on the plate
creates certain relations among them, relations that did not exist when the apples were apart).
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firm's membership. Although he failed to justify that assumption, he
had a separate argument for the existence of a persisting corporate
entity.
[C]onsider for a moment any composite whole. Is a house merely the
sum of the bricks that compose it? This question cannot well be
answered in the affirmative; for you may change many of the bricks
without changing the identity of the house .... To come still closer
to the subject, take such a simple idea as "school" . ... Was there
ever a schoolboy who had any difficulty in understanding that his
school is something distinct from the boys that constitute it? He does
not need to be told that the school may preserve its identity after a
new generation of boys have grown up, so that not a single pupil
remains the same, and though every teacher may have changed and
though the school building may have been moved to a different
location. He finds nothing strange or mystical in the conception of
the school as an entity.23'
Thus, Machen concluded, "much instruction would be required to
make a healthy boy believe that the school . . . is a short-hand expres-
sion for the several members of the school . . . . so that every time a
new boy joins the school. . . , there is a new school."1 2
As this Article has shown, an aggregate theorist confronted with
Machen's statement would have to maintain that a new, if only
slightly different, "school" is created every time a new boy joins it.
Machen's point, however, was that people invariably perceive the
school as the same school in spite of the change in its membership.
The aggregationist presumably would reply that such a perception
arises only as a matter of convenience, 233 and that if forced to think
the matter through, people would have to admit that the "school's"
identity actually has changed. Machen, though, believed that entities
such as schools and corporations have an objective reality .23  But he
231. Id. at 258-59. See also Laski, supra note 17, at 404-05 and supra text accompanying
note 225 (where similar examples are used).
232. Machen, supra note 17, at 259.
233. See F.A. HAYEK, TH COUNTER-REvoLuToN OF SCIENCE: STtrDts ON THE AausE OF
REASON 95, 96 (Liberty Press paperback ed. 1979) (wholes identified by collectivist approaches to
social science are no more than provisional theories, models, or mental constructs); Quinton,
supra note 14, at 10 (describing, but not adopting, the view that social objects like corporations
are logical constructions, which means that they "are not concrete things but abstractions, con-
venient devices of abbreviation for thinking about the social actions and relations of individual
human beings"). See also De George, supra note 14, at 4 (describing, but not endorsing, the
view that supra-individualistic language is a "shorthand way of speaking about individuals takerr
collectively").
234. Machen, supra note 17, at 260-61 (referring to corporations).
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refused to "waste words in discussing the nature of the existence of
[the] corporate entity," or to consider whether it is "ideal or mate-
rial. 2 5 Nonetheless, he did assert that because corporations lack rea-
son and will, they are not like natural persons.2 6
Whatever one may think of Machen's assertions, they at least seem
to demonstrate the corporate entity's existence as a concept in thought
and language. As the linguist Sanford Schane maintained in a 1987
article, language treats the corporation not only as a real entity, but as
a real entity akin to a natural person. 2 7 Nouns such as "corpora-
tion," "university," and "church," he observed, usually are treated
as singular and as incompatible with plural verbs and pronouns. 2t
Also, people readily use cognitive verbs with institutional nouns, and
these verbs depict mental states. 3 9 Furthermore, while some verbs that
describe activities are incompatible with institutional nouns, other ac-
tion verbs are used with such nouns. As depicted by the language,
therefore, corporations are singular entities (not aggregates) with cog-
nitive capacity and the ability to act in certain ways.
The obvious response to all of this, however, is that while Machen
and Schane make interesting linguistic points, their arguments do
nothing to demonstrate the corporate entity's real existence outside
235. Id. at 261.
236. Id. at 265. See also id. at 256-57 (where Machen seems skeptical about organic theories
of the corporation). However, he apparently did think that corporations can act. See id. at 267.
237. See generally Schane, supra note 5, at 592-609. The literature on the holism-methodo-
logical individualism debate includes some other more or less linguistic points that might be
adapted to support the real entity theory of corporations. For example, some philosophers argue
that social concepts (e.g., "corporation") are not definable in terms of concepts relating solely
to individuals. See, e.g., LrrrLE, supra note 12, at 184-86. Others note that two different groups
can have the same human members. Ruben, supra note 14, at 301; Quinton, supra note 14, at
21-22. Also, some philosophers observe that people sometimes describe groups in terms that do
not apply to their constituent individuals. For example, while Germany is said to be populous,
no individual German can be so described; and when one says that a corporation is large, one is
not referring to the size of its members. De George, supra note 14, at 9-10; Quinton, supra note
14, at 8.
238. Schane, supra note 5, at 601. For example, one says "the corporation has aligned itself
with labor" rather than "the corporation have aligned themselves with labor." As Schane notes
and as everyday experience confirms, however, people sometimes do use plural verbs and pron-
ouns when speaking of corporations and other institutions. For example: "IBM announced that
they were coming out with a new computer." Id. n.102.
239. Id. at 603-04. For example: "General Motors once believed that it had an invulnerable
market position," or "Ford denied that the Pinto was a deathtrap." Id. at 603. Physiological
verbs, however, ordinarily do not coexist with institutional nouns. Id. at 602-03. For example,
sentences such as "Toyota slept through the meeting" create an incongruous tension between
subject and verb. One exception to this generalization occurs when one speaks metaphorically, as
for instance in the sentence "General Motors slept while its competitors nibbled away at its
market share."
240. Id. at 604. For example, compare "General Motors signed a contract with the UAW"
with "General Motors voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984." See id.
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thought and language. 24 1 The problem, as philosophers sometimes say,
is how thought and language "hook onto" the world.Y42 Perhaps
Machen and Schane thought either that language is a reliable guide to
the world it purports to describe, or that it constitutes that world. But
while arguments to each effect are available,243 real entity theorists ap-
parently have failed to make them.
C. Group Socialization and Its Implications
1. Brown's Argument
Leaving further concerns about language and its implications to
philosophers, this Article turns to an argument that probably is the
241. "The naive realism which uncritically assumes that where there are commonly used con-
cepts there must also be definite 'given' things which they describe is so deeply embedded in
current thought about social phenomena that it requires a deliberate effort of will to free our-
selves from it." HAYEK, supra note 233, at 96. See also Raimo Tuomela, Ruben and the Meta-
physics of the Social World, 40 BRrr. J. FOR Ptm. Sci. 261, 263 (1989) (criticizing the "linguistic
Myth of the Given," according to which "language is somehow logically tied to the world").
242.
Kant described the problem of how anything in the mind can be a "representation" of
anything outside the mind as the most difficult riddle in philosophy. Since the so-
called linguistic turn in philosophy earlier in this century, that question has been re-
placed by the question "How does language hook onto the world?" but the replace-
ment has not made finding an answer any easier.
HILAY PUTNAM, RENEwINo PsHiosorsy 21 (1992) (footnote omitted).
243. One possibility is that because people use concepts to deal with the external world, a
concept's widespread acceptance and persistence over time suggest that it corresponds to some-
thing in that world. Thus, because "corporation" and other institutional terms have long been
accepted, there might be some reason to think that real corporate entities exist "out there." As
noted earlier, however, the obvious response is that what really exists are aggregates of indivi-
duals, which are treated as entities mainly for linguistic convenience.
Another argument apparently rejects the premise that there is an external world to which con-
cepts might correspond. According to a position sometimes called conceptual relativism, differ-
ent cultures may employ different conceptual schemes for defining what exists in the world, and
it is impossible to rationally conclude that any such scheme defines reality better than any other.
See, e.g., LrTrLE, supra note 121 at 203; see generally id. at 202-14 (describing and criticizing
conceptual relativism and a related position called belief relativism). Conceptual relativism easily
can lead to the view that there is no external reality (or at least none that people can apprehend),
and that the concepts each culture uses in its language constitute the only reality its members can
have. For example:
II]n discussing language philosophically we are in fact discussing what counts as be-
longing to the world. Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in
the language that we use. The concepts we have settle for us the form of the experi-
ence we have of the world .... [T]here is no way of getting outside the concepts in
terms of which we think of the world .... The world is for us what is presented
through those concepts.
PETER WtNc, THE IDEA OF A SOCtAL SCIENCE AND rrs RELATION TO PHmOsoPtY 15 (1958). See
also Peter Winch, Understanding A Primitive Society, 1 AM. PHiL. Q. 307 (1964) (applying this
general view to other societies and their conceptual schemes). Thus, if language continually
treats corporations as real entities, presumably they are real entities under the only available test
of reality.
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best traditional basis for the real entity theory. After recognizing that
the law views a corporation as a person distinct from the sum of its
human members, W. Jethro Brown's 1905 article considered whether
legal personhood is merely a useful device, or whether the law "is
building on certain real and deep analogies to natural personality
which exist wholly apart from legal recognition.' '24 This inquiry, he
continued, requires an examination of human associations in general:
Whenever men act in common they inevitably tend to develop a spirit
which is something different from themselves taken singly or in sum.
No one who has had any experience as a member of a governing
body, for example, can be ignorant of the fact that the decisions of
such a body, even when they are unanimous, are often inexplicable if
regarded from the point of view of the several characters of the
individual members considered as so many units. When at a meeting
of such a board a speaker begins with the statement, "I speak as a
member of this board, and I say-," there will be reason to
anticipate statements or proposals which are not adequately
representative of the person making them. Under the inspiration of
esprit de corps, the humane will give a cruel decision, the cruel a
humane.2
As Brown elaborated, by becoming a member of a group, "the indi-
vidual is affected, however slightly, yet to some extent; qualities have
been developed in him which cannot be explained save by reference to
the union." 2
After this, Brown went on to assert that groups such as corpora-
tions constitute real persons with a group will or group spirit. 247 This
corporate person, he said, is "neither a physical reality nor an organ-
ism," but rather "a representation of psychical realities which the law
recognizes rather than creates." ' 24 He did little or nothing, however,
to justify these claims. 249
244. Brown, supra note 17, at 367-68.
245. Id. at 368.
246. Id. at 379; see also De George, supra note 14, at 5-6 (arguing that individuals are consti-
tuted by their social relations). In the preceding quotation, therefore, Brown was referring to
genuine qualitative change within the people composing the governing body he described. In
particular, he was not noting the familiar fact that people in such situations sometimes retain
their original identity while compromising on a decision none would have supported originally.
On the latter tendency, see MAY, supra note 182, at 69-70 (presenting a hypothetical model of
corporate decision making).
247. See Brown, supra note 17, at 369-72.
248. Id.
249. Apparently Brown thought that a group will comes into existence when the same pur-
poses reside in each corporate member. Nevertheless, many persons' possession of the same
11071994]
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Nonetheless, by noting the qualitative changes people undergo after
they enter groups, Brown identified a consideration highly relevant to
the question whether corporations are real entities or aggregates.
These palpable facts of human existence, which early twentieth cen-
tury opponents of the real entity theory readily conceded ,250 are regu-
larly noted in organizational behavior texts. 5' To be sure, these
changes should vary within and among the various classes of people
who form corporations. In some cases, the variations may be minute.
For example, while one would expect the archetypal organization man
to be significantly shaped by his corporate employment, it is unlikely
that the average person changes appreciably after purchasing a cor-
poration's stock for the first time.25 2
2. Problems for the Aggregate Theory
Aggregate theories of the firm normally assert that a corporation is
simply the sum of its human constituents and nothing else. From
this, it seems to follow that the "corporation's" attributes are the sum
of its human components' attributes and nothing more. But if people
change after they enter corporations, the firm's attributes obviously
cannot be the attributes those people possessed before they joined up.
At any particular time, that is, the corporation's attributes (the sum
of its members' attributes at that time) obviously differ from the sum
mindset seems to be just that and nothing more; by itself, it provides no basis for assuming that
a distinct group will exists. As for the real corporate person, Brown may have thought that it is
the "unit" formed when the firm's members become sufficiently unified in purpose. Again,
however, a collection of people sharing a common purpose arguably is just that and nothing
more. See id, at 369 (which inspired these conjectures).
250. See Morris R. Cohen, Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy, 16 J.
PHM. PSYCHOIV. & SCI. METHODS 673, 680 (1919) ("If we mean to assert that every group has
distinctive group marks and that there is something uniting the different individuals so that they
act differently than they would if they were not so interdependent, no one can well deny such
reality .. "); Radin, supra note 17, at 663-64 (membership in corporations and other groups
causes people to develop loyalties and interests "distinct from those which bind the members
together as human beings"); Smith, supra note 17, at 292 (recognizing the "obvious fact that
people behave differently and get different results in an organization than when acting alone");
Wolff, supra note 17, at 501 ("If a thousand people form an assembly, they may at times take a
resolution which they would not have approved as isolated individuals.").
251. See, e.g., GARY JOHNS, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING LIFE AT WORK
288-91 (1983); JOE KELLY, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAvIoua: AN EXISTENTLAL-SYSTEMS APPROACH
344-51 (revised ed. 1974); STEPHEN P. ROBBniS, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: CONCEPTS, CON-
TROVERSIES, AND APPLICATIONS 476-79 (4th annotated instructor's ed. 1989) (all describing the
socialization processes undergone by new employees).
252. Brown apparently thought that some change occurs even in the case of shareholders,
however. See Brown, supra note 17, at 377.
253. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text. In some versions of the theory, however,
the aggregate many include nonhuman elements as well.
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of the attributes those people possessed prior to entering the firm.
Thus, the aggregate theory fails to describe corporations if it asserts
that a firm is the sum of its human elements as those people existed
before forming the corporation.
The apparent solution to this problem is simply to say that at any
particular time, "the corporation" equals the sum of its members as
they exist inside the firm at that time. 2 4 This seems to account for the
socialization processes described earlier. Even this version of the ag-
gregate theory, however, is problematic. For one thing, some organi-
zation theorists maintain that corporations and other institutions have
properties such as profits that are not aggregates of their members'
properties or reducible to their members' properties."' Analogously,
some foes of methodological individualism have asserted the existence
of "social facts" or "societal facts" that cannot be satisfactorily de-
rived from facts about individuals.25 6 On the other hand, those indivi-
254. E.g., ROaERTO M. UNOER, KNowLEDGE AND POLITICS 82 (1975) (according to principle
of individualism, one should include "characteristics the individuals have because they are mem-
bers of the group" when aggregating them to characterize the group).
255. See, e.g., MICHAEL KEELEY, A SOCIAL-CoNtRACT THEORY OF ORGANIZAnOs 48, 230
(1988). As the title of his book suggests, Keeley rejects organicist conceptions of organizations.
Nonetheless, he concedes the existence of irreducible group properties. His- other examples of
such properties include "deficits, goods, services, salaries, growth, survival, industrial accidents,
pollution, [and] racial discrimination .. " Id. at 48. Maybe, however, one can regard these
properties as nonhuman elements of a corporate aggregate. See supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
256. Societal facts have been defined (with some circularity) as "any facts concerning the
forms of organization present in a society." Maurice Mandelbaum, Societal Facts, in RYAN,
supra note 222, at 105, 107. If corporations are analogized to society and if collective facts about
corporations are analogized to social facts, then the debate over social facts seems relevant to the
claim that corporations have irreducible group properties, and to the question of whether one
can adequately characterize a corporation by aggregating its members as they appear within the
firm. Collective facts about corporations probably include their organizational structure and
many of the matters listed in supra note 255. Such facts, it is argued, cannot be completely
reduced to facts that relate solely to individuals (usually psychological facts). See, e.g., id. at
107-13; Harold Kincaid, Reduction, Explanation, and Individualism, 53 PHIL. Sct. 492, 494-503
(1986). In order to explain social facts in terms of individual properties, that is, one must include
some "social" data among those properties. See, e.g., Lukes, supra note 222, at 126-27, 128-29;
Mandelbaum, supra, at 108-09. It is suggested, however, that such explanations are not genu-
inely individualistic. More importantly, if explaining social facts requires that individuals be de-
scribed by "social" concepts, maybe this suggests the reality of those concepts. See e.g., IEukes,
supra note 222, at 127 ("Why should we be compelled to talk about the tribesman but not the
tribe, the bank teller but not the bank?").
Nevertheless, methodological individualists sometimes profess to see nothing wrong with indi-
vidualistic explanations of social phenomena that require "social" data. See e.g., Gregory Cur-
rie, Individualism and Global Supervenience, 35 BRIT. J. FOR PHiL. Sci. 345, 347 (1984); Grahant
MacfIonald, Modified Methodological Individualism, 1985-86 PRoc. ARISTOTELIAN SOc'Y 199,
201 (each describing that view). Sometimes it is denied that describing individuals in terms of
social facts implies the existence of such facts. See e.g., Currie, supra, at 347. More importantly
for present purposes, the debate may involve social concepts or theories rather than facts in the
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duals also may give corporations too many attributes. The reason is
that among firm members' properties are many "private" or "per-
sonal" traits, attributes, and features that have nothing to do with"
corporate life as ordinarily understood.5 7 This problem, which also
affects the real entity theory, 258 has led at least one observer to suggest
that a corporation's constituents should be roles rather than human
beings in all their richness.2 19
None of these objections is necessarily fatal to the version of the
aggregate theory just propounded. Nonetheless, even if aggregate
theorists can adequately characterize corporations by summing their
members as they exist after joining up, the victory may be hollow.
First, one has to wonder about the satisfactoriness of any theory that
uses malleable elements (here, human beings) as the fundamental
building blocks for explaining other social phenomena (here, corpora-
tions). Turning from explanatory to normative concerns, both the ag-
gregate theory and the methodological individualism that underlie it
draw much of their inspiration from individualistic values.mw As Brat-
ton remarks, the nexus-of-contracts theory is attractive to many legal
academics because it expresses a "liberal vision in which individual
choice shapes social life." ' 26 To the extent that people are shaped by
normal sense of the term. See, e.g., Harold Kincaid, Discussion: Eliminativism and Methodolog-
ical Individualism, 57 Pin. Sc. 141, 146 (1990) (nothing in the Kincaid article cited supra
claimed to show the existence of real social entities over and above their members; instead, it
involved theories and explanation); Mandelbaum, supra, at Ill (argument that social facts are
irreducible to psychological facts may be reformulated as holding that sociological concepts can-
not be translated into psychological concepts). See also id. at 114-16 (apparently refusing to
argue that social facts exist as a matter of ontology). If so, a previous question returns: what
does the language in which those concepts and theories are stated say about reality?
257. For example, suppose that Joe, Jean, Art, and Suzy are employees of the XYZ Corpo-
ration. Suppose further that in their nonworking hours Joe raises hamsters, Jean races motorcy-
cles, Art writes poetry, and Suzy works for the presidential campaign of koss Perot. The point is
that if a corporation's attributes equal the sum of its members' attributes as they exist within the
firm, XYZ must include all these apparently noncorporate matters.
258. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
259. After arguing that collectives are real things of a certain kind, David Copp notes that
"the account I have proposed implies that ... my arm is a part of my university." Copp, supra
note 14, at 265. Then, after remarking that "part" generally refers to "parts of a relevant
kind," he suggests that it might be better to use roles rather than people to constitute collectives.
See id. at 266-67; see also Phillips, supra note 54, at 444-45 (suggesting an imaginary slicing
apart of concrete human beings make persons-in-their-corporate-aspect the firm's constituents).
260. E.g., Ernest Gellner, Holism Versus Individualism, in BRODnECK, supra note 38, at 254,
256: "Individualists who attempt to save us, in the name of logic and liberty, from misconstru-
ing our situation, are not wholly free at all times from the suspicion that a little propaganda for
laissezfaire is being hitched on to these very general issues." Of course, real entity theorists may
have their own (more or less communitarian) agenda as well. See, e.g., supra notes 147-53 and
accompanying text (discussing the progressive implications of the real entity theory). And some
academic holists may have a tangible interest in the success of that view. See infra note 309.
261. Bratton II, supra note 5, at 457-58.
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their social relations, however, those values may lose meaning. Where
group socialization effects significant changes in people, that experi-
ence may shape those people much more than they autonomously
shape the groups they join. In such cases, Bratton's "liberal vision"
would be very imperfectly realized even if the groups in question can
be described as aggregates. To take some extreme examples, suppose
that the most tightly knit corporations-not to mention the military,
monasteries, and even ant colonies-can be adequately described as
aggregates of their members. Even so, who would regard such aggre-
gates as havens for individualistic values or as contexts in which au-
tonomous individual choices shape group life?
3. A Possible Contractualist Response
The problem that aggregationists and contractualists must over-
come is the tendency for social relations to shape people. Apparently
what is needed are individualistic explanations of social phenomena
that presuppose human beings with fairly stable traits and disposi-
tions.162 Nexus-of-contracts theorists might assert that economic the-
ory is ideally equipped to provide such explanations. Contractualists
apparently assume that the units constituting corporations are not
flesh-and-blood human beings, but rather are rational, utility-maxi-
mizing "economic men."2 63 Thus, they could plausibly maintain that
because these abstract units retain their identity throughout their in-
teractions with each other, they are not shaped or constituted by those
interactions. If so, conceiving the corporation as a nexus-of-contracts
among such parties would avoid all the problems just discussed.
This suggested argument, however, meets the familiar objection
that the assumptions of economics are unrealistic-and hence un-
true-because they do not capture human beings in their full variety
and complexity. 26 If so, it is difficult to see how the nexus-of-con-
262. For example, a much-quoted 1950s exponent of methodological individualism asserted
that in explaining social regularities individualistically, one should employ "only very general
assumptions about human dispositions." Watkins, supra note 38, at 278; see id. at 279. It has
been argued, however, that explanations based on materialistic assumptions (for example, ge-
netic makeup, physical brain states) and in terms of basic human instincts that presuppose con-
sciousness (for example, aggression, gratification) have not proven persuasive in explaining
social phenomena. See Lukes, supra note 222, at 124-26, 128-29; see also ROSENBERG, supra note
12, at 141-70 ch. 6 (describing the difficulties faced by explanations couched in terms of rational
choice theory and sociobiology).
263. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
264. Sometimes philosophers of economics concede the point. E.g., John Stuart Mill, On the
Definition and Method of Political Economy, in DANIEL M. HAusMAN (ED.), TiE PntIosoPVY OF
EcoNoMIcs: AN ANTHOLOGY 52-54, 58 (1984). After noting how economists assume that people
desire to maximize wealth, for example, Mill observed that no "political economist was ever so
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tracts theory of the corporation could be true either. Nevertheless,
perhaps an analogy to natural science might salvage this Article's sug-
gested contractualist argument. Like economic theory, natural science
employs entities and laws that are unrealistic in the sense that they do
not fully reflect everyday experience. 6 The argument could continue,
however, that the laws and entities of natural science nonetheless are
true because they enable people to predict a wide range of phenom-
ena. Thus, if the nexus-of-contracts theory can achieve similar predic-
tive successes with corporations, it also would deserve to be called
true.
This reasoning, however, encounters several difficulties. Although
the subject is best left to specialists, it hardly seems likely that the
nexus-of-contracts theory has successfully predicted everything about
corporations. More importantly, one is entitled to wonder what such
successes would mean were they to occur. For example, even Judge
Richard Posner recently conceded that because economic theories are
not falsifiable but only confirmable, and because more than one theo-
retical explanation for a given set of observations can exist, such theo-
ries are tenuously grounded.266 Even if these problems were overcome,
it still would be unclear whether one can validly reason from predic-
tive success to truth.2 67 In fact, philosophers of economics who judge
absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but because this is the mode in
which science must necessarily proceed." Id. at 53. Later he suggested that for this reason, eco-
nomics is valid mainly for "certain departments of human affairs, in which the acquisition of
wealth is the main and acknowledged end." Id. at 54. See also Daniel M. Hausman, Economic
Methodology in a Nutshell, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 116-17 (1989) (suggesting that most orthodox
economists still subscribe to Mill's views).
265.
[flt is true that the assumptions of economic theory are one-dimensional and pallid
when viewed as descriptions of human behavior. . .. However, abstraction . .. is of
the essence of scientific inquiry. A scientific theory must select from the welter of
experience that it is trying to explain, and it is therefore necessarily unrealistic when
compared directly to actual conditions .... Similarly, an economic theory of law will
not capture the full complexity, richness, and confusion of the phenomena ... that it
seeks to illuminate. But its lack of realism, far from invalidating the theory, is the
essential precondition of theory. A theory that sought faithfully to reproduce the com-
plexity of the empirical world in its assumptions would not be a theory-an explana-
tion-but a description.
RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYStS OF LAW 15-16 (3d ed. 1986).
266. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 365 (1990). According to Pos-
ner, the main reasons that economic theories cannot be falsified are the richness of modern
economic theory (which means that almost any hypothesis can be made consistent with it), and
the difficulty of performing experiments that would decisively refute a hypothesis. See id. at 363-
64.
267. In the philosophy of science, for example, there is a significant disagreement between
so-called realists (who assert that natural science's entities and laws really exist) and anti-realists,
positivists, or instrumentalists (who say that they are predictively useful and not much else). See
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economic assumptions by their predictive success generally do not
claim that such assumptions literally are true just because they enable
successful predictions.' Instead, they only are useful.26
4. Implications for the Real Entity Theory
That human beings are shaped by their social relations, therefore,
creates problems for the aggregate and nexus-of-contract theories. It
does not automatically follow, however, that corporations are real en-
tities.170 Still, it is possible to argue from human malleability to the
conclusion that corporations and other social groups exist in their own
right. The basic idea underlying the argument is that any collection of
people who interact on a regular basis, all of whom are what they are
due to those interactions, has some claim to be called a real entity.
Perhaps the clearest statement of this view comes from an early
twentieth century writer, L.T. Hobhouse, who cannot be accused of
excessive fondness for organicist theories of society, the state, and so-
cial groups.2 7I Despite his antipathy to such theories, Hobhouse found
it difficult to reject their starting point, the notion that organized soci-
ety is something more than the individuals who compose it. "Every
e.g., IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING: INTRODUCTORY Topics IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF NATURL SCIENCE 21-22 (1983); HAUSMAN, supra note 264, at 5-6. The main realist argument,
one sometimes called "the inference to the best explanation," basically asserts that the obvious
and best explanation for the predictive success of a theory and its entities is that they accurately
describe the real world. On the other hand, antirealists often maintain that because theoretical
entities are unobservable and because multiple theoretical explanations of perceived phenomena
are possible, one cannot argue from explanatory power to truth. Thus, things only are as if a
successful theory and its entities are true. On these points, see, e.g., ANTHONv O'HEAR, INTRO-
DUCTION TO Tm PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 111-23 (1989).
268. For descriptions of this position, which sometimes is called instrumentalism, see, e.g.,
ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 74-76; Hausman, supra note 264, at 119-22. The classic statement
of the position is Milton Friedman's 1953 essay entitled The Methodology of Pdsitive Econom-
ics, which is reprinted in HAUSMAN, supra note 264, at 210-44. See id. at 218-24 (containing
several statements about the unrealism of economic assumptions). Friedman's views resemble the
antirealist views about science described in supra note 267. See e.g., id. at 220, 222, 223 (each
containing "as if" statements about the truth of scientific or economic theories).
269. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 74-75 (analogizing economic instrumentalism to
the antirealist scientific views discussed in supra note 267).
270. For example, some observers adopt positions intermediate between full-blown method-
ological individualism and full-blown holism. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 222, at 4-6 (reject-
ing individualistic explanations of social phenomena while also rejecting the view that groups are
real entities); Philip Pettit, Social Holism and Moral Theory: A Defence of Bradley's Thesis,
1985-86 PRoc. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 173, 174-80 (arguing that individuals are shaped by their
social context but denying that they are parts of a greater whole with causal powers that tran-
scend the powers of individual agents).
271. "In the bombing of London I had just witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a
false and wicked doctrine [Hegel's theories of freedom and the state], the foundations of which
lay, as I believe, in the book before me [one of Hegel's works]." LEONARD T. HOaHOUSE, THE
METAPHYSiCAL To ORY OF THE STATE: A CRITICISM 6 (1951).
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association of men," he declared, "is legitimately regarded as an en-
tity possessing certain characteristics of its own, characteristics which
do not belong to the individuals apart from their membership of that
association." '272 After describing the family as such an entity, he
turned to organized social groups such as corporations.
In an organized body, a profession, for example, a Trade Union, a
business, a factory, there is again a whole numbering so many
scores, hundreds, thousands of individuals as its members. In every
case the members are in greater or lesser degree modified by the
association into which they enter. 'Of the Trade Union, of the
profession or business, certain things will hold true, which would not
hold true of the individuals who belong to any of those associations
if they did not belong to them. But again in the whole there is
nothing but the coordinated or associated activity of the individuals
which constitute it. This remains true though the organization may
be permanent and the individuals changing. 273
Then Hobhouse noted two fallacies commonly found in discussions of
society and social groups:
"On the one hand, we may be tempted to deny the reality of the
social group, refusing to conceive it as a distinct entity, insisting on
resolving it into its component individuals as though these
individuals were unaffected by the fact of association. On the other
[hand), in reaction from this exaggerated individualism, we are apt
to regard society as an entity distinct from the individuals, not
merely in the sense that it is an aggregate of individuals viewed in
some special relation, but in the sense that it is a whole which in
some way stands outside them, or in which they are merged to the
prejudice of their individual identity." 274
In Hobhouse's view, then, a corporation might best qualify as a
system: a collection of people united into a coherent whole by the mu-
tual social relations that shape them. 275 Because "[in every case the
272. Id. at 27.
273. Id. at 28-29.
274. Id. at 29.
275. See PETER A. ANGELES, THE HARPER COLLINS DICTIONARY OF PHmIosoPHY 306 (1992)
(defining the term "system" in somewhat this fashion). The notion that organizations are best
conceptualized as systems has enjoyed some popularity within organization theory. See, e.g.,
KELLY, supra note 251, at 123-57 (ch. 4). According to Kelly's 1974 text, systems theory rejects
"the traditional physical science method of breaking wholes into parts." Id. at 125. It also em-
braces "holism," which "is usually put forward as synergism-that the whole, usually the exec-
utive team, produces more than the arithmetical sum of the individual executives' efforts." Id.
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members are in greater or lesser degree modified by the association
into which they enter, 2 76 this system's attributes cannot be described
as the sum of those members' attributes as they existed before joining.
As noted earlier, however, a summation of its members' attributes as
they exist within the firm at any point in time may be an adequate
description. 277 Thus, if aggregate and contractual theorists can over-
come all the problems presented by such an effort, perhaps the char-
acterization of corporations depends on how one wants to regard
them. 78
For at least two reasons, however, it may sometimes be preferable
to regard Hobhouse's corporate systems as real entities. The first, a
consideration this Article has alluded to repeatedly in preceding pages,
concerns the problems posed by "micro" explanations of social phe-
nomena whose human building blocks are not fixed. Because group
systems such as corporations also undergo changes, however, perhaps
the question is one of relative instability. But in some cases, collectivi-
ties seem to possess a continuity and fixity not found in the people
whose lives they shape. To take two of Laski's examples, 279 Eton and
the House of Commons both have identities and traditions with some
persistence over time-identities and traditions that arguably have
shaped their students and members much more than any of them have
shaped those two institutions. The second reason for preferring to
characterize the corporate system as a real entity concerns the various
at 131. In addition, systems theory accepts the proposition "that everything that happens or
changes affects everything else." Id. at 128. Finally, it conceives of the organization as an organ-
ism. See id. at 128-30.
Although systems theory and its biological analogies are not the only ways of conceiving or-
ganizations, apparently they remain influential. For example, in a 1988 book that criticizes such
approaches and offers a competing social-contract model of organizations, Michael Keeley con-
cedes: "It is common ... to model organizations after biological systems. In most texts aimed
at present or prospective managers, organizations are depicted as social 'actors' that possess the
distinguishing features of living beings: goals, needs, welfares of their own, etc." KEELEY, supra
note 255, at 10.
276. HOBIOUSE, supra note 271, at 28-29; see supra text accompanying note 273.
277. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. Some of Hobhouse's remarks might be read
as conceding this possibility. For example, he suggested that a corporation is "an aggregate of
individuals viewed in some special relation," and said that "in the whole there is nothing but the
coordinated or associated activity of the individuals which constitute it." HoaHousE, supra note
271, at 29; see supra text accompanying notes 273-74; see also HOBHOuSE at 28 (life of associa-
tion is nothing more than the sum of the lives of its members as members).
278. For example, a leading contemporary methodological individualist concedes that one
reason for his position is "aesthetic": "it is always more satisfying to open the black box and see
the workings of the mechanism." Jon Elster, Marxism and Methodological Individualism, in
PIERRE BIRNBAUM & JEAN LECA (EDS.), INDIVIDUALISM: THEORIES AND METHODS 46, 47 (1990).
To this, hopefully it is sufficient to say that holists apparently operate under a different aes-
thetic.
279. See supra text accompanying note 225.
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linguistic arguments Machen and Schane advanced.280 Although those
arguments prove inconclusive due to questions about language's abil-
ity to represent reality, they are not without persuasive force. For this
reason, they bolster the Hobhousian arguments made here.
5. Objections
Despite its attractions, the version of the real entity theory just pro-
pounded encounters several difficulties. They include the following
objections.
(a) Unobservability
Some parts of the corporate system (e.g., the relations between its
members) are not directly observable. 2 1 For this reason and others,
the corporate system is not directly observable in its entirety.282 In-
stead, its existence is inferred from things that can be observed-for
example, the behavior of the corporation's members. The same gener-
ally is true, however, of various things ordinarily regarded as real-
for example, some theoretical entities of physics and other minds. 283
Only if something must be observable to be real, therefore, does the
corporate system's imperceptibility defeat the claim that it exists.
(b) Overendowing the Corporate Entity
As noted earlier, if one takes seriously the claim that a corporation
is simply its members aggregated, one almost certainly overendows it
with innumerable "private," noncorporate attributes .28 The aggre-
280. See supra notes 231-40 and accompanying text.
281. Eg., J.W.N. Watkins, Ideal Types and Historical Explanation, in RYAN, supra note
222, at 82, 89 (making this criticism of holism).
282. "Social wholes are not given to us as what we may call 'natural units' which we recog-
nize as similar with our senses, as we do with flowers or butterflies, minerals or light rays, or
even forests or ant heaps." HAYEK, supra note 233, at 96-97. But see ERNEST NAGEL, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 540 (2d ed. 1979);
Lukes, supra note 222, at 123 (suggesting that people may really ol~serve collective wholes such
as parades, ceremonies, crowds, and court procedures).
283. E.g., Lukes, supra note 222, at 123 (other people's intentions); Quinton, supra note 14,
at 9 (theoretical entities of natural science). Some philosophers of science, however, evidently
base their doubts about the reality of natural science's theoretical entities on those entities'
unobservability. See supra note 267. More importantly, some readers might maintain that this
Article relies on the unobservability of "economic man" when maintaining that the nexus-of-
qontracts theory cannot provide a true account of corporations. See supra notes 266-69 and
accompanying text. There, however, the problem was not that construct's unobservability-peo-
pie sometimes do behave as rational wealth-maximizers. Rather, the problem was its failure to
include all facets of human behavior.
284. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
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gate theory's best apparent solution to this difficulty is to regard a
corporation as the sum of its members' roles rather than the sum of
those members in their individual totality. This contrivance poses
problems for a theory that purports to explain social phenomena in
terms of allegedly solid, independent, self-contained individual units.
It also creates difficulties, however, for the view that corporations are
system-like real entities. Nonetheless, those difficulties may be less se-
vere in this case. If corporate systems are regarded as real things, per-
haps one would be less apt to expect solidity and stability from their
constituents and to be troubled by the absence of those traits. Indeed,
the system's reality may not be affected much by the fluidity and in-
stability of its constituents.
(c) Weak Socialization
This section's key argument against the aggregate and contractual
theories and for the real entity theory urges that human beings are
shaped by their social relations. But as even Brown recognized, the
degree of that shaping varies considerably from case to case .285 Share-
holders, for example, are less likely to be affected by their corporate
affiliations than are long-time employees and managers. This might
lead to the view that the "real corporation" consists only of those
people who have been significantly shaped by their intragroup rela-
tions. For this reason, it also might compel the anomalous conclusion
that many corporate shareholders are not really part of their firms.
Indeed, this argument stretches further. Today, there is some rea-
son to believe that unlike the archetypal "organization men" of the
1950s, many managers and employees are so little attached to their
firms that their corporate affiliations shape them in only the most mi-
nor ways.28' To the extent that this is so, it might make little sense to
treat corporations as system-like real entities, even though they might
be so described in theory. This is especially true in situations where
the main forces shaping the firm are the autonomous values and
drives of one person or a small group of people. Corporations domi-
nated by one person or a few people and some close corporations
might qualify.
285. See supra notes 246, 252 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., ROnERT JACKALL, MORAt MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 59
(1988) (describing how modern managers employ the rhetoric of team play to advance their ca-
reers, while detaching from their organizations and even from themselves, and not internalizing
the values they pronounce); see also id. at 59, 214 n.5 (where Jackall criticizes writers such as
William f. Whyte and David Riesman for overstressing the extent to which managers identify
with their firms).
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(d) Authoritarian or Totalitarian Implications?
Finally, there is the familiar charge that viewing social groups as
real entities has anti-individualistic, if not authoritarian or even totali-
tarian, implications.287 However, the view of corporations advanced
here, while perhaps unpalatable to strong libertarians, hardly implies
that people are cells in a corporate organism to whose higher purposes
they must (and perhaps should) submit. Although he regarded groups
as real entities, Hobhouse refused to go so far.28 Moreover, as just
suggested, today many corporation members seem relatively unaf-
fected by their group affiliations. Due to multiple group memberships
and personal attachments, furthermore, corporations do not totally
preempt those people's lives in any event. As a result, the corporate
real entity depicted here is something less than a full-blooded moral
organism. And even if corporations are group-persons, how could
that fact's unpalatable implications make it false?2 9
D. The Real Entity Theory's Implications Reconsidered
1. A Summary
Some traditional arguments for the real entity theory seem uncon-
vincing when taken in isolation. Laski's felt corporate reality and
Machen's equation, for example, would persuade only the already
converted. Although Machen's and Schane's linguistic observations
are interesting and suggestive, they fail to convince without some
demonstrated link between language and the reality it purports to de-
scribe. Nevertheless, all these arguments at least might bolster more
persuasive rationales for the real entity theory. Brown and Hobhouse
arguably provide such rationales. But the picture of corporations their
arguments suggest-a system of interacting individuals whose identi-
ties are shaped by that interaction-hardly is immune to criticism. In
addition, some might alternatively regard that "system" as an aggre-
gate of its members as they exist within the firm. The same human
malleability that gives Brown's and Hobhoxse's arguments some plau-
287. See, e.g., supra note 221. A related concern is that, regardless of whether real entity
theories really have strongly authoritarian implications, those theories provide useful rhetorical
ammunition for those with authoritarian leanings. See, e.g., KEELEY, supra note 255, at 51-52.
But can this possibility justify suppressing inquiry into the nature of corporations?
288. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
289. "If these [anti-individualistic] consequences followed from what is the case, the fact
that they are unpalatable would not be adequate reason for denying the view [that society is a
super-entity]." De George, supra note 14, at 10 (who then denies that social groups are such
entities).
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sibility, however, also creates difficulties for such an attempt at aggre-
gation. Even if that attempt succeeds, moreover, individualists may
not find the result very satisfying. Finally, it seems unlikely that cor-
porate contractualism and its underlying economic assumptions can
rescue the aggregate theory from the many problems afflicting it.
2. The Validity of the Real Entity Theory's Asserted Implications
All things considered, therefore, viewing corporations as system-
like real entities may pose fewer problems than regarding them as ag-
gregates or as collections of interrelated contracts. Assuming ar-
guendo that corporations are real entities of this kind, how would that
fact affect section II's conclusions about the real entity theory's impli-
cations?
(a) Horwitz's Six Implications
Although some of the conclusions in section II depend critically on
the nature of the corporate entity, this is not true of Horwitz's six
implications of the real entity theory. Indeed, three of them-
(destroying any charter-based rationale for state regulation of
corporations, undermining ultra vires, and undoing the states' ability
to exclude foreign corporations)-depend less on a clearly
demonstrated real entity than on the concession/fiction theory's
invalidity . 90 Three others-(undermining shareholders' intrafirm
power position in general and the rule of unanimous shareholder
consent to mergers and consolidations in particular, plus limited
liability for shareholders)-arguably coincide with almost any kind of
corporate entity. 291 Thus, all of Horwitz's arguments seem consistent
with the assumption that corporations are system-like real entities.
(b) Hager's Progressive Implications
Of Hager's various "progressive" implications of the real entity
theory, only two seem relevant here.292 For these two implications,
however, the nature of the corporate real entity is significant. One of
them, Hager's claim that the real entity theory legitimizes participa-
tory, communitarian institutions intermediate between big govern-
290. See supra notes 122-25, 138-44 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
292. As discussed earlier, Hager's claim that corporate real entities are public in nature and
hence can justly be regulated probably does not follow from the theory. See supra notes 156-58
and accompanying text. For his disagreement with Horwitz over the real entity theory's implica-
tions for the majority-vote rule on mergers and consolidations, see supra notes 159-60 and ac-
companying text, does not seem to depend on whether corporations are system-like real entities.
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ment and an atomized mass of individuals, 29 may well require a more
organic corporate entity than anything offered here. The other, corpo-
rate criminal and tort liability,294 depends partly on a question ad-
dressed below: whether corporations are the kinds of entities that can
have moral duties. Whether Hobhousian corporations are such enti-
ties remains unclear. 295 Thus, the assumption that corporations are
system-like real entities seems insufficient to support Hager's two
most relevant assertions.
(c) The Contractualist Agenda
If corporations are real entities of any kind, it is difficult to see how
the nexus-of-contracts theory can be true. Even if the real entity the-
ory is implausible, moreover, it is questionable whether the aggregate
and nexus-of-contracts theories fare much better. 29 If the contractual-
ist agenda depends on the nexus-of-contracts theory's validity,29
therefore, that agenda collapses under either assumption.
Nonetheless, the real entity theory probably gives independent sup-
port to one element in the contractualist agenda-the view that rules
of corporate law should be nonmandatory. 298 The real entity theory's
validity, however, might provide additional reasons for rejecting that
agenda's two other components. As this Article explained above, if
corporations are the kinds of real entities that can have moral obliga-
tions, the main contractualist argument against corporate social re-
sponsibility cannot stand, and the contractualist position on hostile
takeovers faces difficulties. 29 Even though there is some disagreement
on the criteria for determining whether an entity can have ethical obli-
gations,3°° many observers have assumed that those tests are intent (or
some other culpable mental state) and the ability to act.3 1' A Hobhou-
293. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
295. It is doubtful, however, whether this conclusion has much practical significance. Today,
corporate criminal and tort liability depends much more on instrumental considerations than on
the presence or absence of corporate moral fault. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
296. See generally supra notes 253-69 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 174 (questioning whether the contractual theory's normative conclusions
logically flow from its descriptive base).
298. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 195-201, 207-08 and accompanying text.
300. In addition to the test stated below, some philosophers have urged that rather than
employing the standards applied to human beings, tests of moral responsibility specifically tai-
lored to corporations are needed. See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson, Personalizing Corporate Ontol-
dgy: The French Way, in CURTLER (ED.), supra note 182, at 99, 110-11; Virginia Held,
Corporations, Persons, and Responsibtility, in CURTLER (ED.), supra note 182, at 159, 161.
301. See supra note 182.
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sian corporation should meet the latter standard because it can act
through the people who compose it. But what about the ability to
form intentions or other guilty mental states? Nothing in the previous
account suggests that a corporation is a group-person with a real mind
and a real will.102 Although the leading theory of corporate moral re-
sponsibility in the business ethics literature asserts that corporations
are responsible because they have an internal decision making struc-
ture that can be described as acting intentionally,303 this position is
controversial. °4 Another possibility is to say that because a corpora-
tion's human members are part of that firm, their culpable mental
states are also the corporation's culpable mental states. 05 Whether
one may regard those states as genuinely corporate, however, appears
unclear. For all these reasons, it is debatable whether corporations-as-
systems have moral obligations whose breach would render them
blameworthy. This conclusion, however, does not affect the previous
paragraph's contention that the nexus-of-contracts theory cannot jus-
tify the contractualist agenda.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This Article's aim has been to reappraise the real entity theory of
the corporation. Along with several commentators, it maintains that
the theory, if valid, would have certain implications for the law and
for related policy disputes. Although some of these implications are
not live issues, others plainly are significant today. Many of the theo-
ry's modern implications, however, depend on the nature of the real
entity asserted. As this Article has asserted, the most plausible version
of the real entity theory fails to clearly support all those implications.
Nevertheless, that version of the theory and the arguments underlying
it do have an important negative consequence: They undermine the
aggregate and nexus-of-contracts theories and much of the practical
agenda developed by proponents of the latter.
If nothing else, therefore, this Article suggests that the contractual
theory's current popularity is undeserved, and counsels skepticism
about the legal and policy conclusions which allegedly flow from it.
302. Cf. Gellner, supra note 260, at 257 (suggesting, in a 1950s essay, that no one would
seriously advocate a "group mind" theory these days).
303. See, e.g., French, supra note 182, at 19-38; Peter A. French, The Corporation as a
Moral Person, in MAY & HoFFmAN, supra note 221, at 133, 141-48; see also WERHA"E, supra
note 15, at 34-40 (explaining French's theory).
304. See generally CURTLER, supra note 182 (containing several essays that either attack
French or state different views). See also Velasquez, supra note 33, at 9 (French's theory fails
because corporate policies and procedures are not genuine minds with real intentions).
305. See Phillips, supra note 54, at 453.
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But this Article also suggests skepticism about the whole enterprise of
postulating theories of the corporation and deriving practical conclu-
sions from them. If the arguments in section III are even minimally
correct, the real entity theory is only somewhat more plausible than its
aggregate and contractual counterparts. As Horwitz has observed,
moreover, "[t]he argument between entity and contractual theorists
during the 1880s and 1890s was, at bottom, a conflict over whether
the individual or group was the appropriate unit of economic, politi-
cal, and legal analysis." 306 That argument, in turn, is part of a larger
300-year dispute between methodological individualists and holists,3°0
a dispute which continues to divide philosophers and social scientists.
Perhaps because they perceive that fundamental values are at issue, °0
participants in the debate tend to regard their positions as self-evi-
dent.309 For this reason, as well as the inherent difficulty of the issues
it presents, no one should expect a truce in the war between holists
and methodological individualists any time soon. This being the case,
it is foolish to assume that any particular theory of the corporation is
incontestable.
At present, then, theories of the corporation are poor foundations
on which to base a practical agenda. This is not to say that such theo-
ries always lack clear implications. Rather, it is to say that those im-
plications are no more secure than the theory on which they allegedly
306. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 220.
3 0 7 . "
The ontological questions concern what you recognize as the factors you will invoke to
account for social life [j ... the terms you accept as ultimate in the order of explana-
tion. The big debate in this area, which has been raging now for more than three
centuries, divides atomists from holists, as I propose to call them. The former are
often referred to as methodological individualists.
Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in NANCY L. ROSENBLUM
(ED.1, LIEALaSM AND =e Moa.it LIFE 159, 159 (1989) (footnote omitted).
308. See, e.g., Gellner, supra note 260, at 256 and supra note 260 (suggesting that methodo-
logical individualists are sometimes inspired by laissez faire views). Of course, holists tend to
have their own, bradly communitarian, agenda. See, e.g., supra notes 150-51 and accompany-
ing text (some progressive real entity theorists supported the theory because it could legitimize
intermediate institutions that could serve as new communities for a mass of increasingly atom-
ized and isolated individuals).
Practical interests, however, probably fuel the debate as well. As Alexander Rosenberg writes:
Part of the argument for holism derives from the motive of showing sociology to be
an "autonomous science"-one distinct from and independent from psychology. This
motive parallels a similar one among psychologists, who hope to show that their disci-
pline is independent of more fundamental ones in the life sciences, like neurophysiol-
ogy.
RosENBERd, supra note 12, at 115.
309. "To each side in this dispute, its own position appears very nearly self-evident, and the
opponents' position something that can be said, but not seriously practised." Gellner, supra note
260, at 255-56.
REAPPRAISING REAL ENTITY THEORY
rest. If corporate theory is a weak reed, then what can take its place?
One obvious possibility is a retreat to Deweyian instrumentalism. 10
To be sure, that approach has its problems-most notably, its over-
concern with consequences and its apparent failure to develop satis-
factory moral criteria for assessing them."' But it does not preclude
the application of such criteria. Rather than relying on a dubious the-
ory, for example, supporters of the contractualist agenda might make
their case by detailing how the agenda's consequences would further
values such as autonomy and wealth or utility maximization. 1 2
No doubt instrumentalism is less satisfying than the possession of a
descriptively sound theory of the corporation with definite moral and
legal implications. If this Article's arguments are at all correct, how-
ever, no such theory is either in hand or on the horizon. Absent such a
theory, scholars concerned with corporate law issues simply will have
to muddle through. Indeed, that is arguably what they did from the
1920s through the 1970s. Based on this experience, one can imagine
worse fates.3 13
310. See generally supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text. Business ethicists, however,
probably lack this option. In their debate over corporate moral responsibility, see, e.g., supra
notes 301-06 and accompanying text, the main concern is whether corporations are morally obli-
gated to behave in a socially responsible fashion even though the law does not compel them to
do so. It is difficult to see how such obligations can be created using a method analogous to the
method legal instrumentalists use to justify legal rules. That method, basically, is to make the
adoption of a particular legal concept or rule (e.g., corporate personhood) depend on its conse-
quences. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. But if corporate moral responsibility
depends on the existence of a real corporate entity with certain attributes, how can the good
consequences of its existence bring such an entity into being? Thus, business ethicists must con-
cern themselves with the nature of corporations.
311. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 174 (suggesting that such values can serve as independent ethical bases
for the contractualist agenda, and also suggesting that contractualism's normative goals may not
logically follow from the nexus-of-contracts theory).
313. See Bratton I, supra note 5, at 1501-10. In this account, Bratton "looks only to corpo-
rate doctrine, drawing on the definitions of the firm operative in treatises and other doctrinal
work from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century." Id. at 1501. These sources, he
says, state a "doctrinal theory of the firm" that survived both the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century debates about the nature of the corporation and the demise of corporate theo-
rizing after 1930, and that continue to inform corporate doctrine today. Id. at 1501-02; see also
id. at 1510 (discussing the post-1930 period). This doctrinal theory of the firm, Bratton contin-
ues:
[Miediates the tensions [between individualism and the demands of collective enter-
prise]. It amalgamates the theoretical alternatives, averting controversy by balancing
the variant points of view advanced in more purely theoretical contexts .... And it
appears to have performed a useful function: As a base of agreement on basic concep-
tions, it has permitted corporate law decision makers to subordinate theoretical con-
cerns and look to the particulars of situations in deciding cases.
Id. at 1502.
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